| 1936 v1.4 - buyz2men (Oct 01, 2017, 3:41 am) |
| hi am glad to be here good work keep it on [Reply] |
| 1936 v1.5 - charlesf (Sep 20, 2010, 10:23 am) |
Hi guys,
just thought I'd send you the finalised version I shall be using in
my next playtest. As indicated in an earlier mail, I've gone back on
the Adriatic change as the below Realpolitik module map for Winter
1935 readily shows (the module is attached as a zip-file).
Having done my homework, I'm as of now looking for playtesters for a
new game (having decided to after all run a follow-up game). If
interested, send me a ranked power preference list. I'll aim for a
healthy mix of players so as not to have this turn into too
"incestuous" an affair.
As nobody objected to me doing so, I'm also releasing my DC319
spreadsheet which contains the seasonal DP allocations.
Cheers,
Charles
PS: Jimmy, no, I certainly do not want to heighten any bilateral
tensions to a fever pitch. So having East Prussia be anything other
than a simple buffer province was very much out of the question.
I've been musing though over turning Gdynia also into a German
potential build site as Danzig was a German city. But then that'd be
the type of exception I'd rather not implement without very good
cause.[Reply] |
| 1936 v1.4 - charlesf (Sep 19, 2010, 9:08 am) |
Karsten,
thanks for your input. As you shall see, I once thought not so
unlike you...
having
the chance to lead USSR to it's doom in the current game, I
thought I add my 2 cents considering the balance in the east:
I found it rather hard to find a position for my soviet armies in
the very early game, that did not leave another front totally
vulnerable (well, the two times I was daring enough to do it both
were followed by my neighbors jumping exactly on me exactly
there... but that could have to do with the diplomatic situation
as well).
Nigel managed to gain three SCs in his first year. All in different
regions: Up north Finland, further south Latvia and in the Near-East
Iran. Nor did he lose any of his home SCs while making those gains.
It can be done.
But is the USSR quite vulnerable at game-start? Yes. That's how I
want it to be. I want players to feel the same kind of paranoia as
Uncle Joe felt about a possible anti-Soviet capitalist crusade. The
communists hadn't yet forgotten that the great powers had intervened
on the Whites' side during the Russian Civil War...
In game-terms, this is the price the Soviet Union pays for enjoying
a board-edge position. Uncle Joe doesn't have to maintain a 360
degress defence as most other powers have to. That has long-term
advantages.
Heading south, you forfeit your options in Scandinavia and with
some bad luck, you lose the Baltic states and have Britain
knocking on your door with two tempi and neutral support in
Leningrad. Heading completely north, you forfeit Iraq and Iran,
having Turkey eying Stalingrad directly, able to support
themselves in easily. Sending one unit south, one north and on
west makes you completely depending on DP and other player's help
(where I managed to get screwed, say... three times?).
The USSR will have to decide where it wants to focus its energies.
There are basically five general directions towards which one can
make a play during the first year:
1. Scandinavia (Finland/Sweden)
2. Latvia
3. Rumania/Cracow
4. Near-East (Iran/Ankara)
Obviously the USSR cannot make a play for all of those. The question
then is whether it goes for two or three out of these four.
As for "Turkey eying Stalingrad directly", here's one idea how you
might neutralise that threat:
Offer France favours by Republican Spain (e.g. support into Madrid)
in exchange for her arranging a bounce with Turkey over Alexandretta
(or for her simply moving there). That'd tie down A Ankara very
nicely.
Incidentally on of the was how the Republicans can be used to
further Soviet interests...
There
are two major weak points that can be very easily addressed inmho:
1.) NRG borders LEN. This does give the British player a major
advantage in taking Scanfinavia, as he will almost for sure have a
fleet sitting in NRG, which is in fact necessary to take Norway
Britain could take Norway via NTH, provided it gets minor power
support.
In any case, Britain need not gun for Norway in the first year.
London might decide to make more of a play for any of
Den/Net/Bel/Bre instead.
Perhaps the USSR could get the Brits to not enter NRG in return for
Uncle Joe doing Britain a favour in Spain or the Near-East.
Considering how Britain is bound to fear Turkish expansion into the
Near-East and have a considerable interest in having Spanish affairs
working out in a way amenable to Britain, I dare say Moscow has got
a number of diplomatic cards to play.
-
but does put constant pressure on LEN. a USSR fleet build LEN(nc)
in case you have an early gain is not only the most direct
declaration of war to britain, but cannot be used for anything
else than northern Scandinavia, while Soviet armies are
desperately needed everywhere on the map. Removing Len(nc) is not
an option, but reacing it via ARO and Finland (not to forget it's
baltic borders) should suffice to balance the region. Thus, I
would relocate NRG to not border LEN.
We'll have to agree to disagree there. I love that the Western-most
and Eastern-most powers are quite close to another in the Far North.
As they might ultimately be in the Near-East.
Gives you added diplomatic complexity and does justice to the high
Anglo-Soviet tensions during the interwar period.
2.)
The second,? I even think grave problem is the "claim" the map
gives Poland on the Baltic states, which makes it difficult to dip
about their fate.
Poland's in a pole-position regarding these two SCs. Much as say
Germany is when it comes to Denmark and the Netherlands. To expect
say an equal division of those two SCs, is to expect quite much.
That's like say Britain expecting to get Belgium in Standard. It
ain't the norm.
They
are polish home SC right now, and that will always make Poland
want them badly. It does in the end give you more flexibility to
build. Yet as three of them is much too much - it does neither
reflect Poland's situation in the era, nor does it by any means
reflect the importance of the SC that are flagged "build SC" in
the Baltic.
Poland's diplomatic position is not set in stone in this game.
Historically Poland horribly bungled its interwar diplomacy, if you
ask me. The "Jagiellonian dream" of establishing a Polish-led
power-block on territory once belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth wasn't a pipedream. In light of the precarious
independence many states gained on account of German and Russian
defeat, whilst those countries were bound to reemerge from a period
weakness, I think there indeed existed a quite compelling
pull-factor for these states to form a confederation led by the
region's most powerful state: Poland.
Of course, Poland made a royal mess of it by picking fights with
almost all her neighbours. That's what thwarted the Intermarum
project. I chose to not burden my Polish player with the same
unenlightened greed that kept such alliances and confederations
largely merely on the drawing-board.
Yet
simply removing one or two pink circles does not do the job for
me, as any expansion of both USSR and Poland will still result in
a clash there with units, that cannot be send elsewhere easily. So
what I would do redrawing the map is:
- Remove SC LAT completely. It didn't have that much importance
historically,
Riga's been a key city for centuries. Had Peter the Great taken
Riga, he'd have made that his capital, I understand. Saint
Petersburg was a poor substitute.
? and
for the sake of the game's balance in the region this serves as
well.
If one subscribes to the thesis that the balance is off in the first
place.
-
Create an SC EUK, not being a build SC for anyone.
- redraw WUK and STA so EUK does no longer touch Moscow.
- optional: redraw STA to not have an (wc) and make EUK a build SC
(home of the Black Sea fleet)
You might be interested to see how this part of the map looked like
in the variant's very first draft back in 2004. Sounds like it was a
mirror-image of what you propose (save for Latvia, that is):
As you can tell by the variant having evolved further, I didn't
particularly like this arrangement. I've long-since paired down both
the USSR and Germany to 3-SC powers. Works IMO much better and as I
read more about the times, the more comfortable I felt with me doing
so.
And
thus [a Sevastopol SC] serves to have another reason for Turkey
and USSR to fight over, as an IRAQ/IRAN agreement now can be done
too easily imho.
Easily done? I think the whole issue is very tricky for both Turkey
and the USSR.
Indeed, one reason why I scaled the USSR down to three SCs is that I
didn't like the then overly antagonistic Soviet-Turkish relations. I
wanted the Black Sea to be initially quiescent rather than a
battleground for F Sevastopol and F Ankara (the shift of the Turkish
fleet to Izmir is also one reason why I prefered a 3-SC Russia. Much
better there!).
As a
plus, it gives a strategic very important region the role it
deserves - just think of the battles of Sevastopol and Kharkov,
both EUk.
It's already pretty important a space. But if you look at the map,
you'll see that only the three major German objectives in the USSR
(Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad) have SC status. I happen to like
that.
Good discussion.
Cheers,
Charles[Reply] |
| 1936 v1.4 - Nitsch (Sep 19, 2010, 6:39 am) |
Gentlemen,
having the chance to lead USSR to it's doom in the current game, I thought
I add my 2 cents considering the balance in the east:
I found it rather hard to find a position for my soviet armies in the very
early game, that did not leave another front totally vulnerable (well, the
two times I was daring enough to do it both were followed by my neighbors
jumping exactly on me exactly there... but that could have to do with the
diplomatic situation as well). Heading south, you forfeit your options in
Scandinavia and with some bad luck, you lose the Baltic states and have
Britain knocking on your door with two tempi and neutral support in
Leningrad. Heading completely north, you forfeit Iraq and Iran, having
Turkey eying Stalingrad directly, able to support themselves in easily.
Sending one unit south, one north and on west makes you completely
depending on DP and other player's help (where I managed to get screwed,
say... three times?).
There are two major weak points that can be very easily addressed inmho:
1.) NRG borders LEN. This does give the British player a major advantage
in taking Scanfinavia, as he will almost for sure have a fleet sitting in
NRG, which is in fact necessary to take Norway - but does put constant
pressure on LEN. a USSR fleet build LEN(nc) in case you have an early gain
is not only the most direct declaration of war to britain, but cannot be
used for anything else than northern Scandinavia, while Soviet armies are
desperately needed everywhere on the map. Removing Len(nc) is not an
option, but reacing it via ARO and Finland (not to forget it's baltic
borders) should suffice to balance the region. Thus, I would relocate NRG
to not border LEN.
2.) The second, I even think grave problem is the "claim" the map gives
Poland on the Baltic states, which makes it difficult to dip about their
fate. They are polish home SC right now, and that will always make Poland
want them badly. It does in the end give you more flexibility to build.
Yet as three of them is much too much - it does neither reflect Poland's
situation in the era, nor does it by any means reflect the importance of
the SC that are flagged "build SC" in the Baltic. Yet simply removing one
or two pink circles does not do the job for me, as any expansion of both
USSR and Poland will still result in a clash there with units, that cannot
be send elsewhere easily. So what I would do redrawing the map is:
- Remove SC LAT completely. It didn't have that much importance
historically, and for the sake of the game's balance in the region this
serves as well.
- Create an SC EUK, not being a build SC for anyone.
- redraw WUK and STA so EUK does no longer touch Moscow.
- optional: redraw STA to not have an (wc) and make EUK a build SC (home
of the Black Sea fleet)
This does result, in terms of tempi, almost in the same location:
bordering a single Soviet home SC and a neutral (polish build option) SC,
which is another move away from a Polish home Sc. Moreover, this gives the
Russian player a single option to take an easy SC, but having to forfeit
concentrating his troops on the north or the Baltic in the first turn. It
will as well never be a completely safe SC, as it is not to far away from
Turkey. And thus it serves to have another reason for Turkey and USSR to
fight over, as an IRAQ/IRAN agreement now can be done too easily imho. As
a plus, it gives a strategic very important region the role it deserves -
just think of the battles of Sevastopol and Kharkov, both EUk.
Just my 2 cents, but happy to read some responses...
Best,
Karsten[Reply] |
| 1936 v1.4 - Nigs (Sep 18, 2010, 4:18 pm) |
Charles,
for what it's worth, I think the SU is underpowered (surprise, surprise) and Poland unhistorically strong. The changes to France may indirectly help, but a weak SU so far from Spain with a Italy in arguably a better position and closer to Spain directly, makes the civil war a distraction for the SU, and maybe even a disadvantage.
I'm not sure how much the last game is useful for typical lessons as to how things would play out again.
Nigs
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 2010 21:27:17 +0200
From: charlesf(at)web.de
To: dirk(at)knemeyer.com
CC: wesaq(at)list.ru; tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com; Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org; jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com; dc319(at)diplomaticcorp.com; davidchegould(at)bigpond.com; c.p.mcinerney(at)gmail.com; dipping_chris(at)yahoo.com; ndeily(at)yahoo.com; congressofvienna1814(at)yahoo.com; VonPowell(at)aol.com; screwtape777(at)gmail.com; max.luckey(at)googlemail.com; mellinger(at)blitzbardgett.com; jamie_nordli(at)hotmail.com; nephilli99(at)hotmail.com; smileyrob68(at)gmail.com; sun.chung(at)gmail.com; nick.s.powell(at)gmail.com; wmysonski(at)gmail.com; karsten.nitsch(at)gmx.de; psychosis(at)sky.com; timothy.d.hayward(at)googlemail.com
Subject: Re: 1936 v1.4
Dirk and all,
thanks for your feedback. Always good to have many "second
opinions" when operating on a patient.
The map I sent you is more of a draft for v1.4 than being
definitive. Particularly since my conviction on the merits of the
changes vary on each one.
A key question here is whether the changes strike a good balance
between a westerly and an easterly orientation of Italy. In other
words: whether the respective Franco-Italian and Turkish-Italian
friction levels are within a desirable range.
And there's another question that follows on from this: Is Italy
(and I'm factoring Nat.Spain, of course) sufficiently strong?
FRENCH ALGERIA
- I think this makes the Italian position weaker. Italy
simply can't have France building fleets in Alg given access to
the STS.
Having Algiers present a far more substantial danger to Italy indeed
does. But I don't agree that Italy cannot afford a French fleet
being built there. First of all, only Naples can be reached by such
a fleet within two moves (leaving aside Algiers-Tunis-Tripoli). So
in this regard, such a fleet build is no different from an army in
Marseilles marching on Milan.
It is more a later movement by such a fleet into NTS or ION that is
dangerous. Fortunately, a fleet build in Algiers gives the Duce a
clear warning. And unless Italy's totally committed in other
directions, a bounce in STS ought to be not so difficult to
engineer.
I'd suggest that Italy would do well to any of the following:
- ensure a French unit keeps blocking the Algiers build site
- have France agree not to build fleets there
- attack Algiers in an effort to make sure it's blocked by a French
unit or have it fall to Italy.
A Tripoli can do much to keep France honest - and more.
THE ALPINE FRONT
And with Tuscany, A Rom is channeled - almost forced - to
either go to the Balkans or Swi only.
I'd say A Rome's viable openings include moves to Croatia, Slovenia,
Austria and South Tyrol (thus pivotting towards Switzerland).
Remaining in place and supporting Austria is another good option
(kinda historically Italy's standing order until 193 .
That's a pretty broad range of options. The unit just doesn't have
all that much of an anti-French use anymore (other than perhaps a
move to Naples in preparation for a convoy over to Algiers, though
I'd say that's probably not the best use of the unit early on.
One weighty reason why I've given A Rome a more easterly bent is
that in turn for greater friction over Algiers, I needed to reduce
Franco-Italian tensions in the Alps. Otherwise friction levels would
have gone through the roof.
So basically four sound opening move options remain for A Rome.
That's a healthy number. And two quite different directions:
striking out into the Balkans or up north into the alps
(Switzerland, Austria).
There is not an attack avenue on France.
Not for A Rome, no. But A Milan can gun for Marseilles immediately.
It's just that without Swiss help you cannot engineer a supported
move on Piedmont.
However, this somewhat diminished offensive potential in the Alps
also means that Piedmont's no longer an Italian soft-spot (i.e. a
locale adjacent to 2+ of her initial SCs).
I'd argue this somewhat decreased offensive potential is not much of
a loss for Italy (if you want to attack Marseilles, investing in
Switzerland may go a long way to defeating a French offensive in
Piedmont - and if France isn't doing that, you don't need a
supported attack anyway). But Italy gains CONSIDERABLY in terms of
security as Rome can't be taken by France in 1936.
Very much a net plus for Italy, methinks. And also for France,
because Italy won't be as paranoid about Piedmont with the redrawn
map.
So this map would seem to prevent Italy from channeling
force and instead to make a series of very defensive decisions:
to parry French or Turkish naval threats? Can't do both, and
whichever is ignored is in trouble.
Italy can mount exactly the same attack it was able to launch in
past versions. Just without A Rome and A Milan combining (hardly
much of a difference as A Switzerland is most likely to be decisive
in a clash over Piedmont).
TURKEY ETC.
Indeed, this makes France and Turkey - in my view - natural
allies. Good news for France, terrible for the USSR.
Oh, I've always considered those two well-suited to another. Their
relationship is characterised by second-degree proximity, which
tends to go hand-in-hand with good alliance potential. And no, A
Beirut, doesn't in my book transform that relationship into one of
first-degree proximity. If players nonetheless view Franco-Turkish
relations in that light, they're plainly misinterpreting what A
Beirut brings table.
Of course, much as France/Turkey enjoy good ally potential on
account of their second-degree proximity, so does the Italy/USSR
pairing (at least if players don't let Spanish affairs overly colour
their relationship).
Italy may also find in Britain now a more useful ally owing to its
more robust presence in the Near East. Perhaps also more of a rival,
but on the whole I'd rate this development as good news for Italy.
- Making Sue a build location is interesting, but I think is
a case where more strength on the board translates into
diplomatic weakness. If I'm Turkey I no longer want Sue out of
greed but out of self-preservation.
Aye, Anglo-Turkish relations are complicated by Britain's enhanced
role in Turkey's backyard. It's indeed something I was gunning for
and that also made me comfortable giving Britain this additional
capability.
That is a much sharper motive, and one that might railroad
more behaviour particularly in light of the fertile FT
possibilities and increased shared interest.
Conversely, that may in turn be met by an Anglo-Italian block.
All that being said, I do wonder if the redrawn Adriatic does overly
heighten IT friction. It's the one change I've been least certain
about. And indeed, I'm now thinking that I may well have turned
Greece into a space that pulls in Italy and Turkey into conflict
much in the way the old Ukraine space did with Poland and Turkey.
So, right now I'm leaning towards undoing the Adriatic change.
The one major motivation for it was that I wanted to further pull
Italy away from France. Perhaps that was overdoing it.
I suppose my biggest concern is that the USSR remains
underpowered, and the changes may further compromise their
position.
If anything, Turkey facing greater challenges HELPS Uncle Joe.
Surely if you can justify Turkey being a 3 SC power Russia
could be a 4.
Oh, an earlier version of 1936 had indeed 4 SCs. I cut it down to
three as you can see. Works better and also reprects the Soviet
weakness with all those purges going on.
SOVIET UNION
No special rules, create an SC for the Urals or something
and done. This seems the one gaping hole, despite your
bullishness over their 6 SC high water mark in 1937. In fact I
would challenge a truly top, expert player to take the current
position on a challenge and see what they could do with it. I
think it is terribly weak relative to the situation of the other
powers.
Piano, piano.  As you know, I'm not in the least worried. In this
I'm as firm as I am about England's much-derided viability and
strength in 1648.
Another small change to consider with USSR is to not have Len
and NRG touch. It only compounds the potential or deep misery
for the Soviets, the nice jumping off point to blitz the British
in the mid-game notwithstanding.
Ah, I love that tension in the Far North! It's historical and makes
for more interesting gaming.
Despite my sharing the concern of others that France was
underpowered, as you know Charles France is one of the powers I
most want to play in this variant. Well, I have to say, even
these subtle changes make me think that now France could be a
premier power.
I'm in the camp of those who considered v1.3's France not too weak.
And now that I've given Algiers build site status, I take solace in
France's poor performance to date. My hope (and belief) is that I
haven't overpowered France.
Not sure the impact that would have on poor little Italy,
but it may help justify having Italy control the Nationalists,
providing an interesting counterweight in the far western Med.
The Nationalist presence of course very much has to be factored into
the Italian power calculation. And having that small base out West
comes also with the hefty potential of a united Spain.
Perhaps 1636's Italy is a power that either does very well or gets
squashed by neighbouring powers. With fairly little middle-ground.
In any case, I've enjoyed this exchange as well as the wider variant
discussion (as I trust you can tell by my long and numerous posts).
I'd love to hear more views on these changes. Just note that the
operating assumption here ought be that the Adriatic will be
returned to its original shape since that's where I am right now on
that question.
Cheers,
Charles
Dirk
On Sep 17, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Charles Féaux de la Croix
wrote:
Hi guys,
I've now decided to run with the various changes I
discussed in my past mail and implemented those on the
below v1.4 map. Here a summary of the changes:
- Both Algiers and Suez are no longer marked
with a red circle as they're now regular HSCs.
- The Tyrrhenian Sea has been divided into Northern and
Southern Tyrrhenian Sea spaces.
- Tuscany makes a comeback.
- The Adriatic now adjoins Greece.
- I've removed the Abruzzi buffer province that was
geared to facilitate an amphibious landing in Italy.
Given the redrawn Adriatic adds to Italy's defense
worries in the East, I felt I might help out Italy be
removing that landing-site.
- I also cut out the now fairly redundant-seeming
Ligurian Sea space. As the SC-space ratio is already
pretty high at 1:2.56, I felt it wise to not further
increase the number of overall spaces. Standard has a
ratio of 1:2.2. Plainly 1936 is a whole lot more fluid
variant, though some of 1936's spaces (e.g. Iceland,
Kuweit, Caspian) are only of very marginal use. So the
"effective" ratio is arguably somewhat lower.
All-in-all, I'd say that Franco-Italian tension is
increased in Africa (owing to the threat potential of the
Algiers HSC), while round Piedmont it has been reduced by
a fair amount. To the East, Turkish-Italian rivalry over
Greece has been intensified.
I'd be interested to hear your take on these recalibration
measures in the wake of Algiers and Suez being promoted to
HSC status.
Charles
<1936_14.jpg>[Reply] |
| 1936 v1.4 - charlesf (Sep 18, 2010, 2:27 pm) |
Dirk and all,
thanks for your feedback. Always good to have many "second
opinions" when operating on a patient.
The map I sent you is more of a draft for v1.4 than being
definitive. Particularly since my conviction on the merits of the
changes vary on each one.
A key question here is whether the changes strike a good balance
between a westerly and an easterly orientation of Italy. In other
words: whether the respective Franco-Italian and Turkish-Italian
friction levels are within a desirable range.
And there's another question that follows on from this: Is Italy
(and I'm factoring Nat.Spain, of course) sufficiently strong?
FRENCH ALGERIA
- I think this makes the Italian position weaker. Italy
simply can't have France building fleets in Alg given access to
the STS.
Having Algiers present a far more substantial danger to Italy indeed
does. But I don't agree that Italy cannot afford a French fleet
being built there. First of all, only Naples can be reached by such
a fleet within two moves (leaving aside Algiers-Tunis-Tripoli). So
in this regard, such a fleet build is no different from an army in
Marseilles marching on Milan.
It is more a later movement by such a fleet into NTS or ION that is
dangerous. Fortunately, a fleet build in Algiers gives the Duce a
clear warning. And unless Italy's totally committed in other
directions, a bounce in STS ought to be not so difficult to
engineer.
I'd suggest that Italy would do well to any of the following:
- ensure a French unit keeps blocking the Algiers build site
- have France agree not to build fleets there
- attack Algiers in an effort to make sure it's blocked by a French
unit or have it fall to Italy.
A Tripoli can do much to keep France honest - and more.
THE ALPINE FRONT
And with Tuscany, A Rom is channeled - almost forced - to
either go to the Balkans or Swi only.
I'd say A Rome's viable openings include moves to Croatia, Slovenia,
Austria and South Tyrol (thus pivotting towards Switzerland).
Remaining in place and supporting Austria is another good option
(kinda historically Italy's standing order until 193.
That's a pretty broad range of options. The unit just doesn't have
all that much of an anti-French use anymore (other than perhaps a
move to Naples in preparation for a convoy over to Algiers, though
I'd say that's probably not the best use of the unit early on.
One weighty reason why I've given A Rome a more easterly bent is
that in turn for greater friction over Algiers, I needed to reduce
Franco-Italian tensions in the Alps. Otherwise friction levels would
have gone through the roof.
So basically four sound opening move options remain for A Rome.
That's a healthy number. And two quite different directions:
striking out into the Balkans or up north into the alps
(Switzerland, Austria).
There is not an attack avenue on France.
Not for A Rome, no. But A Milan can gun for Marseilles immediately.
It's just that without Swiss help you cannot engineer a supported
move on Piedmont.
However, this somewhat diminished offensive potential in the Alps
also means that Piedmont's no longer an Italian soft-spot (i.e. a
locale adjacent to 2+ of her initial SCs).
I'd argue this somewhat decreased offensive potential is not much of
a loss for Italy (if you want to attack Marseilles, investing in
Switzerland may go a long way to defeating a French offensive in
Piedmont - and if France isn't doing that, you don't need a
supported attack anyway). But Italy gains CONSIDERABLY in terms of
security as Rome can't be taken by France in 1936.
Very much a net plus for Italy, methinks. And also for France,
because Italy won't be as paranoid about Piedmont with the redrawn
map.
So this map would seem to prevent Italy from channeling
force and instead to make a series of very defensive decisions:
to parry French or Turkish naval threats? Can't do both, and
whichever is ignored is in trouble.
Italy can mount exactly the same attack it was able to launch in
past versions. Just without A Rome and A Milan combining (hardly
much of a difference as A Switzerland is most likely to be decisive
in a clash over Piedmont).
TURKEY ETC.
Indeed, this makes France and Turkey - in my view - natural
allies. Good news for France, terrible for the USSR.
Oh, I've always considered those two well-suited to another. Their
relationship is characterised by second-degree proximity, which
tends to go hand-in-hand with good alliance potential. And no, A
Beirut, doesn't in my book transform that relationship into one of
first-degree proximity. If players nonetheless view Franco-Turkish
relations in that light, they're plainly misinterpreting what A
Beirut brings table.
Of course, much as France/Turkey enjoy good ally potential on
account of their second-degree proximity, so does the Italy/USSR
pairing (at least if players don't let Spanish affairs overly colour
their relationship).
Italy may also find in Britain now a more useful ally owing to its
more robust presence in the Near East. Perhaps also more of a rival,
but on the whole I'd rate this development as good news for Italy.
- Making Sue a build location is interesting, but I think is
a case where more strength on the board translates into
diplomatic weakness. If I'm Turkey I no longer want Sue out of
greed but out of self-preservation.
Aye, Anglo-Turkish relations are complicated by Britain's enhanced
role in Turkey's backyard. It's indeed something I was gunning for
and that also made me comfortable giving Britain this additional
capability.
That is a much sharper motive, and one that might railroad
more behaviour particularly in light of the fertile FT
possibilities and increased shared interest.
Conversely, that may in turn be met by an Anglo-Italian block.
All that being said, I do wonder if the redrawn Adriatic does overly
heighten IT friction. It's the one change I've been least certain
about. And indeed, I'm now thinking that I may well have turned
Greece into a space that pulls in Italy and Turkey into conflict
much in the way the old Ukraine space did with Poland and Turkey.
So, right now I'm leaning towards undoing the Adriatic change.
The one major motivation for it was that I wanted to further pull
Italy away from France. Perhaps that was overdoing it.
I suppose my biggest concern is that the USSR remains
underpowered, and the changes may further compromise their
position.
If anything, Turkey facing greater challenges HELPS Uncle Joe.
Surely if you can justify Turkey being a 3 SC power Russia
could be a 4.
Oh, an earlier version of 1936 had indeed 4 SCs. I cut it down to
three as you can see. Works better and also reprects the Soviet
weakness with all those purges going on.
SOVIET UNION
No special rules, create an SC for the Urals or something
and done. This seems the one gaping hole, despite your
bullishness over their 6 SC high water mark in 1937. In fact I
would challenge a truly top, expert player to take the current
position on a challenge and see what they could do with it. I
think it is terribly weak relative to the situation of the other
powers.
Piano, piano. As you know, I'm not in the least worried. In this
I'm as firm as I am about England's much-derided viability and
strength in 1648.
Another small change to consider with USSR is to not have Len
and NRG touch. It only compounds the potential or deep misery
for the Soviets, the nice jumping off point to blitz the British
in the mid-game notwithstanding.
Ah, I love that tension in the Far North! It's historical and makes
for more interesting gaming.
Despite my sharing the concern of others that France was
underpowered, as you know Charles France is one of the powers I
most want to play in this variant. Well, I have to say, even
these subtle changes make me think that now France could be a
premier power.
I'm in the camp of those who considered v1.3's France not too weak.
And now that I've given Algiers build site status, I take solace in
France's poor performance to date. My hope (and belief) is that I
haven't overpowered France.
Not sure the impact that would have on poor little Italy,
but it may help justify having Italy control the Nationalists,
providing an interesting counterweight in the far western Med.
The Nationalist presence of course very much has to be factored into
the Italian power calculation. And having that small base out West
comes also with the hefty potential of a united Spain.
Perhaps 1636's Italy is a power that either does very well or gets
squashed by neighbouring powers. With fairly little middle-ground.
In any case, I've enjoyed this exchange as well as the wider variant
discussion (as I trust you can tell by my long and numerous posts).
I'd love to hear more views on these changes. Just note that the
operating assumption here ought be that the Adriatic will be
returned to its original shape since that's where I am right now on
that question.
Cheers,
Charles
Dirk
On Sep 17, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Charles Féaux de la Croix
wrote:
Hi guys,
I've now decided to run with the various changes I
discussed in my past mail and implemented those on the
below v1.4 map. Here a summary of the changes:
- Both Algiers and Suez are no longer marked
with a red circle as they're now regular HSCs.
- The Tyrrhenian Sea has been divided into Northern and
Southern Tyrrhenian Sea spaces.
- Tuscany makes a comeback.
- The Adriatic now adjoins Greece.
- I've removed the Abruzzi buffer province that was
geared to facilitate an amphibious landing in Italy.
Given the redrawn Adriatic adds to Italy's defense
worries in the East, I felt I might help out Italy be
removing that landing-site.
- I also cut out the now fairly redundant-seeming
Ligurian Sea space. As the SC-space ratio is already
pretty high at 1:2.56, I felt it wise to not further
increase the number of overall spaces. Standard has a
ratio of 1:2.2. Plainly 1936 is a whole lot more fluid
variant, though some of 1936's spaces (e.g. Iceland,
Kuweit, Caspian) are only of very marginal use. So the
"effective" ratio is arguably somewhat lower.
All-in-all, I'd say that Franco-Italian tension is
increased in Africa (owing to the threat potential of the
Algiers HSC), while round Piedmont it has been reduced by
a fair amount. To the East, Turkish-Italian rivalry over
Greece has been intensified.
I'd be interested to hear your take on these recalibration
measures in the wake of Algiers and Suez being promoted to
HSC status.
Charles
<1936_14.jpg>[Reply] |
| 1936 v1.4 - dknemeyer (Sep 18, 2010, 10:58 am) |
Hi Charles,
These are interesting changes. Some flash feedback:
- I think this makes the Italian position weaker. Italy simply can't have France building fleets in Alg given access to the STS. And with Tuscany, A Rom is channeled - almost forced - to either go to the Balkans or Swi only. There is not an attack avenue on France. So this map would seem to prevent Italy from channeling force and instead to make a series of very defensive decisions: to parry French or Turkish naval threats? Can't do both, and whichever is ignored is in trouble. Indeed, this makes France and Turkey - in my view - natural allies. Good news for France, terrible for the USSR.
- Making Sue a build location is interesting, but I think is a case where more strength on the board translates into diplomatic weakness. If I'm Turkey I no longer want Sue out of greed but out of self-preservation. That is a much sharper motive, and one that might railroad more behaviour particularly in light of the fertile FT possibilities and increased shared interest.
I suppose my biggest concern is that the USSR remains underpowered, and the changes may further compromise their position. Surely if you can justify Turkey being a 3 SC power Russia could be a 4. No special rules, create an SC for the Urals or something and done. This seems the one gaping hole, despite your bullishness over their 6 SC high water mark in 1937. In fact I would challenge a truly top, expert player to take the current position on a challenge and see what they could do with it. I think it is terribly weak relative to the situation of the other powers.
Another small change to consider with USSR is to not have Len and NRG touch. It only compounds the potential or deep misery for the Soviets, the nice jumping off point to blitz the British in the mid-game notwithstanding.
Despite my sharing the concern of others that France was underpowered, as you know Charles France is one of the powers I most want to play in this variant. Well, I have to say, even these subtle changes make me think that now France could be a premier power. Not sure the impact that would have on poor little Italy, but it may help justify having Italy control the Nationalists, providing an interesting counterweight in the far western Med.
Dirk
On Sep 17, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Charles Féaux de la Croix wrote:
Hi guys,
I've now decided to run with the various changes I discussed in my
past mail and implemented those on the below v1.4 map. Here a
summary of the changes:
- Both Algiers and Suez are no longer marked with a red
circle as they're now regular HSCs.
- The Tyrrhenian Sea has been divided into Northern and Southern
Tyrrhenian Sea spaces.
- Tuscany makes a comeback.
- The Adriatic now adjoins Greece.
- I've removed the Abruzzi buffer province that was geared to
facilitate an amphibious landing in Italy. Given the redrawn
Adriatic adds to Italy's defense worries in the East, I felt I
might help out Italy be removing that landing-site.
- I also cut out the now fairly redundant-seeming Ligurian Sea
space. As the SC-space ratio is already pretty high at 1:2.56, I
felt it wise to not further increase the number of overall spaces.
Standard has a ratio of 1:2.2. Plainly 1936 is a whole lot more
fluid variant, though some of 1936's spaces (e.g. Iceland, Kuweit,
Caspian) are only of very marginal use. So the "effective" ratio
is arguably somewhat lower.
All-in-all, I'd say that Franco-Italian tension is increased in
Africa (owing to the threat potential of the Algiers HSC), while
round Piedmont it has been reduced by a fair amount. To the East,
Turkish-Italian rivalry over Greece has been intensified.
I'd be interested to hear your take on these recalibration measures
in the wake of Algiers and Suez being promoted to HSC status.
Charles
<1936_14.jpg>[Reply] |
| 1936 v1.4 (dc319) buyz2men Oct 01, 03:41 am |
| hi am glad to be here good work keep it on |
| 1936: France's Levantine Army - charlesf (Sep 17, 2010, 1:56 pm) |
Hi Sun,
glad to have you join the discussion. Comments inserted below:
There's been a lot of discussion here about France, and I personally
have had a closer perspective on that power (although not as close as
Nick!) I think I agree that France is a bit hampered, but not to the
degree that has been expressed here.
That has also been my view, basically. I dare say though that after the
extra muscle I've given France in v1.4, the grande nation will be viewed
in another light.
But I think Beirut is an issue for France. If Turkey wanted to boot
France out of the Mideast, France has no option BUT to appeal to
Britain. And unless Britain steps up, France will lose Beirut. Italy
is too far away to do something in year 1 and USSR could threaten
Turkish space from the north, but again, it won't stop Turkey from
taking Beirut. The fleet in Suez is the only potential help that
France has.
I doubt many Turks will devote two units during the first year to the
task of taking Beirut. If either unit gets bounced, then it can no
longer be done. Add to that that A Beirut isn't such a lethal threat to
Kemal's republic than the country's other rivals in the region.
Generally I'd say there are better hunting grounds for a young Turk.
Besides, what about Soviet A Stalingrad-Eastern Anatolia? That would
force a Turkey (even if he made into both EAS and Alex) to choose
whether to push on to Beirut or defend his capital. I count such a
threat as an effective defence ploy. So I simply don't agree with your
assertion that Britain's the only one who might help out in the anyway
unlikely event of Turkey going "all-in" vs. Beirut during 1936.
But this adds a weird dynamic in the sense that it commits France
and Britain to be friendly in the main theater (Western) based upon
the potential situation in a secondary theater (Near East). Also,
unless Suez moves right away, again it'll arrive too late to help
Beirut if Turkey moves two on that center.
As Pr?sident, I wouldn't have the fate of a remote outpost dictate my
foreign policy. One should not get too hung up on the fate of the French
Levant.
I know in Diplomacy there are lots of situations where a power can
commit more resources over a rival and who ever loses out in gaining
the tempo advantage loses, but in this case France can only count on
Britain to help out and forgo any other action. In a situation where
France knew Turkey was going to attack him, France only has two
options - bounce Turkey in Alexandretta or get British help to move
Suez to the north. Normally that's not an issue, but here, France
can't reinforce his position in Beirut. Again, without friendly
British help. And so even if France guessed right and bounced Turkey
from having two on Beirut, it'll only forestall it until the following
year.
I fail to see how this might be a problem (and it's really not quite an
accurate description of the situation anyway as I've argued further above).
Against an undistracted and focused Turkey, France won't be able to hold
Beirut indefinitely. Perhaps this explains why France ceded what's
basically the Alexandretta buffer province to Turkey during the 30s
(with the intermediary step of the independent Hatay Republic).
This all can be filed under "works as intended".
I think one potential option could be to have Iraq border Beirut and
then France could use diplomacy to enlist other friendly powers to use
DPs to aid Beirut in the case of a Turkish threat. But I guess it
could cut both ways and Turkey or Britain can use the neutral to
support an attack into Beirut with just one unit.
Again, I don't share there's a problem here. In any case, as France, I'd
generally not want a neighbouring minor power endanger my holdings.
That's what the Brits have to contend with in Suez. Doesn't make for a
particularly comfortable situation. One reason why Britain might put a
premium on taking out Egypt as an independent player in the region (F
Gibraltar being sent round the Cape of Good Hope to that end).
Net net, I don't know if the army in Beirut really aids France and
actually hurts the French position
Aids.
since 1) France can only appeal to Britain if Turkey attacks his position
Well, we're talking a lot of IFs here (first year, Turkey intent on
taking Beirut). And then there's still the Soviet Union.
and 2) if France loses out and still has his army there, it becomes a
resource drain on France
True. But that would require for the French army to already have moved
away from Beirut as otherwise the Pr?sident might simply disband the unit.
If this is such a major concern for a player, then he'd better make sure
his Levantine army will have to be dislodged in the event of the fall of
Beirut. But as the Pr?sident, I wouldn't be losing much sleep over this
eventuality.
and 3) France has no way to reinforcing or reallocating that unit
effectively by itself.
...at least for not for the foreseeable future. Later on in the game,
France might actually move other forces into the region.
Anyway, it is indeed quite true that event in the Levant might indeed
have repercussions for Metropolitan France (even negative ones if the
scenario you describe comes to pass). But A Beirut nonetheless remains a
valuable French asset. This whole discussion reminds me of a similar one
I once had with someone about 1648, who asserted that A Flanders
presented a liability for Spain. Couldn't disagree more with that claim
or indeed the analogous one regarding 1936's A Beirut.
Charles[Reply] |
| 1936 v1.4 - charlesf (Sep 17, 2010, 12:06 pm) |
Hi guys,
I've now decided to run with the various changes I discussed in my
past mail and implemented those on the below v1.4 map. Here a
summary of the changes:
- Both Algiers and Suez are no longer marked with a red
circle as they're now regular HSCs.
- The Tyrrhenian Sea has been divided into Northern and Southern
Tyrrhenian Sea spaces.
- Tuscany makes a comeback.
- The Adriatic now adjoins Greece.
- I've removed the Abruzzi buffer province that was geared to
facilitate an amphibious landing in Italy. Given the redrawn
Adriatic adds to Italy's defense worries in the East, I felt I
might help out Italy be removing that landing-site.
- I also cut out the now fairly redundant-seeming Ligurian Sea
space. As the SC-space ratio is already pretty high at 1:2.56, I
felt it wise to not further increase the number of overall spaces.
Standard has a ratio of 1:2.2. Plainly 1936 is a whole lot more
fluid variant, though some of 1936's spaces (e.g. Iceland, Kuweit,
Caspian) are only of very marginal use. So the "effective" ratio
is arguably somewhat lower.
All-in-all, I'd say that Franco-Italian tension is increased in
Africa (owing to the threat potential of the Algiers HSC), while
round Piedmont it has been reduced by a fair amount. To the East,
Turkish-Italian rivalry over Greece has been intensified.
I'd be interested to hear your take on these recalibration measures
in the wake of Algiers and Suez being promoted to HSC status.
Charles[Reply] |
| 1936 v1.4 (dc319) dknemeyer Sep 18, 10:58 am |
Hi Charles,
These are interesting changes. Some flash feedback:
- I think this makes the Italian position weaker. Italy simply can't have France building fleets in Alg given access to the STS. And with Tuscany, A Rom is channeled - almost forced - to either go to the Balkans or Swi only. There is not an attack avenue on France. So this map would seem to prevent Italy from channeling force and instead to make a series of very defensive decisions: to parry French or Turkish naval threats? Can't do both, and whichever is ignored is in trouble. Indeed, this makes France and Turkey - in my view - natural allies. Good news for France, terrible for the USSR.
- Making Sue a build location is interesting, but I think is a case where more strength on the board translates into diplomatic weakness. If I'm Turkey I no longer want Sue out of greed but out of self-preservation. That is a much sharper motive, and one that might railroad more behaviour particularly in light of the fertile FT possibilities and increased shared interest.
I suppose my biggest concern is that the USSR remains underpowered, and the changes may further compromise their position. Surely if you can justify Turkey being a 3 SC power Russia could be a 4. No special rules, create an SC for the Urals or something and done. This seems the one gaping hole, despite your bullishness over their 6 SC high water mark in 1937. In fact I would challenge a truly top, expert player to take the current position on a challenge and see what they could do with it. I think it is terribly weak relative to the situation of the other powers.
Another small change to consider with USSR is to not have Len and NRG touch. It only compounds the potential or deep misery for the Soviets, the nice jumping off point to blitz the British in the mid-game notwithstanding.
Despite my sharing the concern of others that France was underpowered, as you know Charles France is one of the powers I most want to play in this variant. Well, I have to say, even these subtle changes make me think that now France could be a premier power. Not sure the impact that would have on poor little Italy, but it may help justify having Italy control the Nationalists, providing an interesting counterweight in the far western Med.
Dirk
On Sep 17, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Charles Féaux de la Croix wrote:
Hi guys,
I've now decided to run with the various changes I discussed in my
past mail and implemented those on the below v1.4 map. Here a
summary of the changes:
- Both Algiers and Suez are no longer marked with a red
circle as they're now regular HSCs.
- The Tyrrhenian Sea has been divided into Northern and Southern
Tyrrhenian Sea spaces.
- Tuscany makes a comeback.
- The Adriatic now adjoins Greece.
- I've removed the Abruzzi buffer province that was geared to
facilitate an amphibious landing in Italy. Given the redrawn
Adriatic adds to Italy's defense worries in the East, I felt I
might help out Italy be removing that landing-site.
- I also cut out the now fairly redundant-seeming Ligurian Sea
space. As the SC-space ratio is already pretty high at 1:2.56, I
felt it wise to not further increase the number of overall spaces.
Standard has a ratio of 1:2.2. Plainly 1936 is a whole lot more
fluid variant, though some of 1936's spaces (e.g. Iceland, Kuweit,
Caspian) are only of very marginal use. So the "effective" ratio
is arguably somewhat lower.
All-in-all, I'd say that Franco-Italian tension is increased in
Africa (owing to the threat potential of the Algiers HSC), while
round Piedmont it has been reduced by a fair amount. To the East,
Turkish-Italian rivalry over Greece has been intensified.
I'd be interested to hear your take on these recalibration measures
in the wake of Algiers and Suez being promoted to HSC status.
Charles
<1936_14.jpg> |
| 1936 v1.4 (dc319) buyz2men Oct 01, 03:41 am |
| hi am glad to be here good work keep it on |
| 1936 v1.4 (dc319) charlesf Sep 18, 02:27 pm |
Dirk and all,
thanks for your feedback. Always good to have many "second
opinions" when operating on a patient.
The map I sent you is more of a draft for v1.4 than being
definitive. Particularly since my conviction on the merits of the
changes vary on each one.
A key question here is whether the changes strike a good balance
between a westerly and an easterly orientation of Italy. In other
words: whether the respective Franco-Italian and Turkish-Italian
friction levels are within a desirable range.
And there's another question that follows on from this: Is Italy
(and I'm factoring Nat.Spain, of course) sufficiently strong?
FRENCH ALGERIA
- I think this makes the Italian position weaker. Italy
simply can't have France building fleets in Alg given access to
the STS.
Having Algiers present a far more substantial danger to Italy indeed
does. But I don't agree that Italy cannot afford a French fleet
being built there. First of all, only Naples can be reached by such
a fleet within two moves (leaving aside Algiers-Tunis-Tripoli). So
in this regard, such a fleet build is no different from an army in
Marseilles marching on Milan.
It is more a later movement by such a fleet into NTS or ION that is
dangerous. Fortunately, a fleet build in Algiers gives the Duce a
clear warning. And unless Italy's totally committed in other
directions, a bounce in STS ought to be not so difficult to
engineer.
I'd suggest that Italy would do well to any of the following:
- ensure a French unit keeps blocking the Algiers build site
- have France agree not to build fleets there
- attack Algiers in an effort to make sure it's blocked by a French
unit or have it fall to Italy.
A Tripoli can do much to keep France honest - and more.
THE ALPINE FRONT
And with Tuscany, A Rom is channeled - almost forced - to
either go to the Balkans or Swi only.
I'd say A Rome's viable openings include moves to Croatia, Slovenia,
Austria and South Tyrol (thus pivotting towards Switzerland).
Remaining in place and supporting Austria is another good option
(kinda historically Italy's standing order until 193.
That's a pretty broad range of options. The unit just doesn't have
all that much of an anti-French use anymore (other than perhaps a
move to Naples in preparation for a convoy over to Algiers, though
I'd say that's probably not the best use of the unit early on.
One weighty reason why I've given A Rome a more easterly bent is
that in turn for greater friction over Algiers, I needed to reduce
Franco-Italian tensions in the Alps. Otherwise friction levels would
have gone through the roof.
So basically four sound opening move options remain for A Rome.
That's a healthy number. And two quite different directions:
striking out into the Balkans or up north into the alps
(Switzerland, Austria).
There is not an attack avenue on France.
Not for A Rome, no. But A Milan can gun for Marseilles immediately.
It's just that without Swiss help you cannot engineer a supported
move on Piedmont.
However, this somewhat diminished offensive potential in the Alps
also means that Piedmont's no longer an Italian soft-spot (i.e. a
locale adjacent to 2+ of her initial SCs).
I'd argue this somewhat decreased offensive potential is not much of
a loss for Italy (if you want to attack Marseilles, investing in
Switzerland may go a long way to defeating a French offensive in
Piedmont - and if France isn't doing that, you don't need a
supported attack anyway). But Italy gains CONSIDERABLY in terms of
security as Rome can't be taken by France in 1936.
Very much a net plus for Italy, methinks. And also for France,
because Italy won't be as paranoid about Piedmont with the redrawn
map.
So this map would seem to prevent Italy from channeling
force and instead to make a series of very defensive decisions:
to parry French or Turkish naval threats? Can't do both, and
whichever is ignored is in trouble.
Italy can mount exactly the same attack it was able to launch in
past versions. Just without A Rome and A Milan combining (hardly
much of a difference as A Switzerland is most likely to be decisive
in a clash over Piedmont).
TURKEY ETC.
Indeed, this makes France and Turkey - in my view - natural
allies. Good news for France, terrible for the USSR.
Oh, I've always considered those two well-suited to another. Their
relationship is characterised by second-degree proximity, which
tends to go hand-in-hand with good alliance potential. And no, A
Beirut, doesn't in my book transform that relationship into one of
first-degree proximity. If players nonetheless view Franco-Turkish
relations in that light, they're plainly misinterpreting what A
Beirut brings table.
Of course, much as France/Turkey enjoy good ally potential on
account of their second-degree proximity, so does the Italy/USSR
pairing (at least if players don't let Spanish affairs overly colour
their relationship).
Italy may also find in Britain now a more useful ally owing to its
more robust presence in the Near East. Perhaps also more of a rival,
but on the whole I'd rate this development as good news for Italy.
- Making Sue a build location is interesting, but I think is
a case where more strength on the board translates into
diplomatic weakness. If I'm Turkey I no longer want Sue out of
greed but out of self-preservation.
Aye, Anglo-Turkish relations are complicated by Britain's enhanced
role in Turkey's backyard. It's indeed something I was gunning for
and that also made me comfortable giving Britain this additional
capability.
That is a much sharper motive, and one that might railroad
more behaviour particularly in light of the fertile FT
possibilities and increased shared interest.
Conversely, that may in turn be met by an Anglo-Italian block.
All that being said, I do wonder if the redrawn Adriatic does overly
heighten IT friction. It's the one change I've been least certain
about. And indeed, I'm now thinking that I may well have turned
Greece into a space that pulls in Italy and Turkey into conflict
much in the way the old Ukraine space did with Poland and Turkey.
So, right now I'm leaning towards undoing the Adriatic change.
The one major motivation for it was that I wanted to further pull
Italy away from France. Perhaps that was overdoing it.
I suppose my biggest concern is that the USSR remains
underpowered, and the changes may further compromise their
position.
If anything, Turkey facing greater challenges HELPS Uncle Joe.
Surely if you can justify Turkey being a 3 SC power Russia
could be a 4.
Oh, an earlier version of 1936 had indeed 4 SCs. I cut it down to
three as you can see. Works better and also reprects the Soviet
weakness with all those purges going on.
SOVIET UNION
No special rules, create an SC for the Urals or something
and done. This seems the one gaping hole, despite your
bullishness over their 6 SC high water mark in 1937. In fact I
would challenge a truly top, expert player to take the current
position on a challenge and see what they could do with it. I
think it is terribly weak relative to the situation of the other
powers.
Piano, piano. As you know, I'm not in the least worried. In this
I'm as firm as I am about England's much-derided viability and
strength in 1648.
Another small change to consider with USSR is to not have Len
and NRG touch. It only compounds the potential or deep misery
for the Soviets, the nice jumping off point to blitz the British
in the mid-game notwithstanding.
Ah, I love that tension in the Far North! It's historical and makes
for more interesting gaming.
Despite my sharing the concern of others that France was
underpowered, as you know Charles France is one of the powers I
most want to play in this variant. Well, I have to say, even
these subtle changes make me think that now France could be a
premier power.
I'm in the camp of those who considered v1.3's France not too weak.
And now that I've given Algiers build site status, I take solace in
France's poor performance to date. My hope (and belief) is that I
haven't overpowered France.
Not sure the impact that would have on poor little Italy,
but it may help justify having Italy control the Nationalists,
providing an interesting counterweight in the far western Med.
The Nationalist presence of course very much has to be factored into
the Italian power calculation. And having that small base out West
comes also with the hefty potential of a united Spain.
Perhaps 1636's Italy is a power that either does very well or gets
squashed by neighbouring powers. With fairly little middle-ground.
In any case, I've enjoyed this exchange as well as the wider variant
discussion (as I trust you can tell by my long and numerous posts).
I'd love to hear more views on these changes. Just note that the
operating assumption here ought be that the Adriatic will be
returned to its original shape since that's where I am right now on
that question.
Cheers,
Charles
Dirk
On Sep 17, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Charles Féaux de la Croix
wrote:
Hi guys,
I've now decided to run with the various changes I
discussed in my past mail and implemented those on the
below v1.4 map. Here a summary of the changes:
- Both Algiers and Suez are no longer marked
with a red circle as they're now regular HSCs.
- The Tyrrhenian Sea has been divided into Northern and
Southern Tyrrhenian Sea spaces.
- Tuscany makes a comeback.
- The Adriatic now adjoins Greece.
- I've removed the Abruzzi buffer province that was
geared to facilitate an amphibious landing in Italy.
Given the redrawn Adriatic adds to Italy's defense
worries in the East, I felt I might help out Italy be
removing that landing-site.
- I also cut out the now fairly redundant-seeming
Ligurian Sea space. As the SC-space ratio is already
pretty high at 1:2.56, I felt it wise to not further
increase the number of overall spaces. Standard has a
ratio of 1:2.2. Plainly 1936 is a whole lot more fluid
variant, though some of 1936's spaces (e.g. Iceland,
Kuweit, Caspian) are only of very marginal use. So the
"effective" ratio is arguably somewhat lower.
All-in-all, I'd say that Franco-Italian tension is
increased in Africa (owing to the threat potential of the
Algiers HSC), while round Piedmont it has been reduced by
a fair amount. To the East, Turkish-Italian rivalry over
Greece has been intensified.
I'd be interested to hear your take on these recalibration
measures in the wake of Algiers and Suez being promoted to
HSC status.
Charles
<1936_14.jpg> |
| 1936 v1.4 (dc319) Nigs Sep 18, 04:18 pm |
Charles,
for what it's worth, I think the SU is underpowered (surprise, surprise) and Poland unhistorically strong. The changes to France may indirectly help, but a weak SU so far from Spain with a Italy in arguably a better position and closer to Spain directly, makes the civil war a distraction for the SU, and maybe even a disadvantage.
I'm not sure how much the last game is useful for typical lessons as to how things would play out again.
Nigs
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 2010 21:27:17 +0200
From: charlesf(at)web.de
To: dirk(at)knemeyer.com
CC: wesaq(at)list.ru; tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com; Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org; jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com; dc319(at)diplomaticcorp.com; davidchegould(at)bigpond.com; c.p.mcinerney(at)gmail.com; dipping_chris(at)yahoo.com; ndeily(at)yahoo.com; congressofvienna1814(at)yahoo.com; VonPowell(at)aol.com; screwtape777(at)gmail.com; max.luckey(at)googlemail.com; mellinger(at)blitzbardgett.com; jamie_nordli(at)hotmail.com; nephilli99(at)hotmail.com; smileyrob68(at)gmail.com; sun.chung(at)gmail.com; nick.s.powell(at)gmail.com; wmysonski(at)gmail.com; karsten.nitsch(at)gmx.de; psychosis(at)sky.com; timothy.d.hayward(at)googlemail.com
Subject: Re: 1936 v1.4
Dirk and all,
thanks for your feedback. Always good to have many "second
opinions" when operating on a patient.
The map I sent you is more of a draft for v1.4 than being
definitive. Particularly since my conviction on the merits of the
changes vary on each one.
A key question here is whether the changes strike a good balance
between a westerly and an easterly orientation of Italy. In other
words: whether the respective Franco-Italian and Turkish-Italian
friction levels are within a desirable range.
And there's another question that follows on from this: Is Italy
(and I'm factoring Nat.Spain, of course) sufficiently strong?
FRENCH ALGERIA
- I think this makes the Italian position weaker. Italy
simply can't have France building fleets in Alg given access to
the STS.
Having Algiers present a far more substantial danger to Italy indeed
does. But I don't agree that Italy cannot afford a French fleet
being built there. First of all, only Naples can be reached by such
a fleet within two moves (leaving aside Algiers-Tunis-Tripoli). So
in this regard, such a fleet build is no different from an army in
Marseilles marching on Milan.
It is more a later movement by such a fleet into NTS or ION that is
dangerous. Fortunately, a fleet build in Algiers gives the Duce a
clear warning. And unless Italy's totally committed in other
directions, a bounce in STS ought to be not so difficult to
engineer.
I'd suggest that Italy would do well to any of the following:
- ensure a French unit keeps blocking the Algiers build site
- have France agree not to build fleets there
- attack Algiers in an effort to make sure it's blocked by a French
unit or have it fall to Italy.
A Tripoli can do much to keep France honest - and more.
THE ALPINE FRONT
And with Tuscany, A Rom is channeled - almost forced - to
either go to the Balkans or Swi only.
I'd say A Rome's viable openings include moves to Croatia, Slovenia,
Austria and South Tyrol (thus pivotting towards Switzerland).
Remaining in place and supporting Austria is another good option
(kinda historically Italy's standing order until 193.
That's a pretty broad range of options. The unit just doesn't have
all that much of an anti-French use anymore (other than perhaps a
move to Naples in preparation for a convoy over to Algiers, though
I'd say that's probably not the best use of the unit early on.
One weighty reason why I've given A Rome a more easterly bent is
that in turn for greater friction over Algiers, I needed to reduce
Franco-Italian tensions in the Alps. Otherwise friction levels would
have gone through the roof.
So basically four sound opening move options remain for A Rome.
That's a healthy number. And two quite different directions:
striking out into the Balkans or up north into the alps
(Switzerland, Austria).
There is not an attack avenue on France.
Not for A Rome, no. But A Milan can gun for Marseilles immediately.
It's just that without Swiss help you cannot engineer a supported
move on Piedmont.
However, this somewhat diminished offensive potential in the Alps
also means that Piedmont's no longer an Italian soft-spot (i.e. a
locale adjacent to 2+ of her initial SCs).
I'd argue this somewhat decreased offensive potential is not much of
a loss for Italy (if you want to attack Marseilles, investing in
Switzerland may go a long way to defeating a French offensive in
Piedmont - and if France isn't doing that, you don't need a
supported attack anyway). But Italy gains CONSIDERABLY in terms of
security as Rome can't be taken by France in 1936.
Very much a net plus for Italy, methinks. And also for France,
because Italy won't be as paranoid about Piedmont with the redrawn
map.
So this map would seem to prevent Italy from channeling
force and instead to make a series of very defensive decisions:
to parry French or Turkish naval threats? Can't do both, and
whichever is ignored is in trouble.
Italy can mount exactly the same attack it was able to launch in
past versions. Just without A Rome and A Milan combining (hardly
much of a difference as A Switzerland is most likely to be decisive
in a clash over Piedmont).
TURKEY ETC.
Indeed, this makes France and Turkey - in my view - natural
allies. Good news for France, terrible for the USSR.
Oh, I've always considered those two well-suited to another. Their
relationship is characterised by second-degree proximity, which
tends to go hand-in-hand with good alliance potential. And no, A
Beirut, doesn't in my book transform that relationship into one of
first-degree proximity. If players nonetheless view Franco-Turkish
relations in that light, they're plainly misinterpreting what A
Beirut brings table.
Of course, much as France/Turkey enjoy good ally potential on
account of their second-degree proximity, so does the Italy/USSR
pairing (at least if players don't let Spanish affairs overly colour
their relationship).
Italy may also find in Britain now a more useful ally owing to its
more robust presence in the Near East. Perhaps also more of a rival,
but on the whole I'd rate this development as good news for Italy.
- Making Sue a build location is interesting, but I think is
a case where more strength on the board translates into
diplomatic weakness. If I'm Turkey I no longer want Sue out of
greed but out of self-preservation.
Aye, Anglo-Turkish relations are complicated by Britain's enhanced
role in Turkey's backyard. It's indeed something I was gunning for
and that also made me comfortable giving Britain this additional
capability.
That is a much sharper motive, and one that might railroad
more behaviour particularly in light of the fertile FT
possibilities and increased shared interest.
Conversely, that may in turn be met by an Anglo-Italian block.
All that being said, I do wonder if the redrawn Adriatic does overly
heighten IT friction. It's the one change I've been least certain
about. And indeed, I'm now thinking that I may well have turned
Greece into a space that pulls in Italy and Turkey into conflict
much in the way the old Ukraine space did with Poland and Turkey.
So, right now I'm leaning towards undoing the Adriatic change.
The one major motivation for it was that I wanted to further pull
Italy away from France. Perhaps that was overdoing it.
I suppose my biggest concern is that the USSR remains
underpowered, and the changes may further compromise their
position.
If anything, Turkey facing greater challenges HELPS Uncle Joe.
Surely if you can justify Turkey being a 3 SC power Russia
could be a 4.
Oh, an earlier version of 1936 had indeed 4 SCs. I cut it down to
three as you can see. Works better and also reprects the Soviet
weakness with all those purges going on.
SOVIET UNION
No special rules, create an SC for the Urals or something
and done. This seems the one gaping hole, despite your
bullishness over their 6 SC high water mark in 1937. In fact I
would challenge a truly top, expert player to take the current
position on a challenge and see what they could do with it. I
think it is terribly weak relative to the situation of the other
powers.
Piano, piano. As you know, I'm not in the least worried. In this
I'm as firm as I am about England's much-derided viability and
strength in 1648.
Another small change to consider with USSR is to not have Len
and NRG touch. It only compounds the potential or deep misery
for the Soviets, the nice jumping off point to blitz the British
in the mid-game notwithstanding.
Ah, I love that tension in the Far North! It's historical and makes
for more interesting gaming.
Despite my sharing the concern of others that France was
underpowered, as you know Charles France is one of the powers I
most want to play in this variant. Well, I have to say, even
these subtle changes make me think that now France could be a
premier power.
I'm in the camp of those who considered v1.3's France not too weak.
And now that I've given Algiers build site status, I take solace in
France's poor performance to date. My hope (and belief) is that I
haven't overpowered France.
Not sure the impact that would have on poor little Italy,
but it may help justify having Italy control the Nationalists,
providing an interesting counterweight in the far western Med.
The Nationalist presence of course very much has to be factored into
the Italian power calculation. And having that small base out West
comes also with the hefty potential of a united Spain.
Perhaps 1636's Italy is a power that either does very well or gets
squashed by neighbouring powers. With fairly little middle-ground.
In any case, I've enjoyed this exchange as well as the wider variant
discussion (as I trust you can tell by my long and numerous posts).
I'd love to hear more views on these changes. Just note that the
operating assumption here ought be that the Adriatic will be
returned to its original shape since that's where I am right now on
that question.
Cheers,
Charles
Dirk
On Sep 17, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Charles Féaux de la Croix
wrote:
Hi guys,
I've now decided to run with the various changes I
discussed in my past mail and implemented those on the
below v1.4 map. Here a summary of the changes:
- Both Algiers and Suez are no longer marked
with a red circle as they're now regular HSCs.
- The Tyrrhenian Sea has been divided into Northern and
Southern Tyrrhenian Sea spaces.
- Tuscany makes a comeback.
- The Adriatic now adjoins Greece.
- I've removed the Abruzzi buffer province that was
geared to facilitate an amphibious landing in Italy.
Given the redrawn Adriatic adds to Italy's defense
worries in the East, I felt I might help out Italy be
removing that landing-site.
- I also cut out the now fairly redundant-seeming
Ligurian Sea space. As the SC-space ratio is already
pretty high at 1:2.56, I felt it wise to not further
increase the number of overall spaces. Standard has a
ratio of 1:2.2. Plainly 1936 is a whole lot more fluid
variant, though some of 1936's spaces (e.g. Iceland,
Kuweit, Caspian) are only of very marginal use. So the
"effective" ratio is arguably somewhat lower.
All-in-all, I'd say that Franco-Italian tension is
increased in Africa (owing to the threat potential of the
Algiers HSC), while round Piedmont it has been reduced by
a fair amount. To the East, Turkish-Italian rivalry over
Greece has been intensified.
I'd be interested to hear your take on these recalibration
measures in the wake of Algiers and Suez being promoted to
HSC status.
Charles
<1936_14.jpg> |
| 1936 v1.4 (dc319) Nitsch Sep 19, 06:39 am |
Gentlemen,
having the chance to lead USSR to it's doom in the current game, I thought
I add my 2 cents considering the balance in the east:
I found it rather hard to find a position for my soviet armies in the very
early game, that did not leave another front totally vulnerable (well, the
two times I was daring enough to do it both were followed by my neighbors
jumping exactly on me exactly there... but that could have to do with the
diplomatic situation as well). Heading south, you forfeit your options in
Scandinavia and with some bad luck, you lose the Baltic states and have
Britain knocking on your door with two tempi and neutral support in
Leningrad. Heading completely north, you forfeit Iraq and Iran, having
Turkey eying Stalingrad directly, able to support themselves in easily.
Sending one unit south, one north and on west makes you completely
depending on DP and other player's help (where I managed to get screwed,
say... three times?).
There are two major weak points that can be very easily addressed inmho:
1.) NRG borders LEN. This does give the British player a major advantage
in taking Scanfinavia, as he will almost for sure have a fleet sitting in
NRG, which is in fact necessary to take Norway - but does put constant
pressure on LEN. a USSR fleet build LEN(nc) in case you have an early gain
is not only the most direct declaration of war to britain, but cannot be
used for anything else than northern Scandinavia, while Soviet armies are
desperately needed everywhere on the map. Removing Len(nc) is not an
option, but reacing it via ARO and Finland (not to forget it's baltic
borders) should suffice to balance the region. Thus, I would relocate NRG
to not border LEN.
2.) The second, I even think grave problem is the "claim" the map gives
Poland on the Baltic states, which makes it difficult to dip about their
fate. They are polish home SC right now, and that will always make Poland
want them badly. It does in the end give you more flexibility to build.
Yet as three of them is much too much - it does neither reflect Poland's
situation in the era, nor does it by any means reflect the importance of
the SC that are flagged "build SC" in the Baltic. Yet simply removing one
or two pink circles does not do the job for me, as any expansion of both
USSR and Poland will still result in a clash there with units, that cannot
be send elsewhere easily. So what I would do redrawing the map is:
- Remove SC LAT completely. It didn't have that much importance
historically, and for the sake of the game's balance in the region this
serves as well.
- Create an SC EUK, not being a build SC for anyone.
- redraw WUK and STA so EUK does no longer touch Moscow.
- optional: redraw STA to not have an (wc) and make EUK a build SC (home
of the Black Sea fleet)
This does result, in terms of tempi, almost in the same location:
bordering a single Soviet home SC and a neutral (polish build option) SC,
which is another move away from a Polish home Sc. Moreover, this gives the
Russian player a single option to take an easy SC, but having to forfeit
concentrating his troops on the north or the Baltic in the first turn. It
will as well never be a completely safe SC, as it is not to far away from
Turkey. And thus it serves to have another reason for Turkey and USSR to
fight over, as an IRAQ/IRAN agreement now can be done too easily imho. As
a plus, it gives a strategic very important region the role it deserves -
just think of the battles of Sevastopol and Kharkov, both EUk.
Just my 2 cents, but happy to read some responses...
Best,
Karsten |
| 1936 v1.4 (dc319) charlesf Sep 19, 09:08 am |
Karsten,
thanks for your input. As you shall see, I once thought not so
unlike you...
having
the chance to lead USSR to it's doom in the current game, I
thought I add my 2 cents considering the balance in the east:
I found it rather hard to find a position for my soviet armies in
the very early game, that did not leave another front totally
vulnerable (well, the two times I was daring enough to do it both
were followed by my neighbors jumping exactly on me exactly
there... but that could have to do with the diplomatic situation
as well).
Nigel managed to gain three SCs in his first year. All in different
regions: Up north Finland, further south Latvia and in the Near-East
Iran. Nor did he lose any of his home SCs while making those gains.
It can be done.
But is the USSR quite vulnerable at game-start? Yes. That's how I
want it to be. I want players to feel the same kind of paranoia as
Uncle Joe felt about a possible anti-Soviet capitalist crusade. The
communists hadn't yet forgotten that the great powers had intervened
on the Whites' side during the Russian Civil War...
In game-terms, this is the price the Soviet Union pays for enjoying
a board-edge position. Uncle Joe doesn't have to maintain a 360
degress defence as most other powers have to. That has long-term
advantages.
Heading south, you forfeit your options in Scandinavia and with
some bad luck, you lose the Baltic states and have Britain
knocking on your door with two tempi and neutral support in
Leningrad. Heading completely north, you forfeit Iraq and Iran,
having Turkey eying Stalingrad directly, able to support
themselves in easily. Sending one unit south, one north and on
west makes you completely depending on DP and other player's help
(where I managed to get screwed, say... three times?).
The USSR will have to decide where it wants to focus its energies.
There are basically five general directions towards which one can
make a play during the first year:
1. Scandinavia (Finland/Sweden)
2. Latvia
3. Rumania/Cracow
4. Near-East (Iran/Ankara)
Obviously the USSR cannot make a play for all of those. The question
then is whether it goes for two or three out of these four.
As for "Turkey eying Stalingrad directly", here's one idea how you
might neutralise that threat:
Offer France favours by Republican Spain (e.g. support into Madrid)
in exchange for her arranging a bounce with Turkey over Alexandretta
(or for her simply moving there). That'd tie down A Ankara very
nicely.
Incidentally on of the was how the Republicans can be used to
further Soviet interests...
There
are two major weak points that can be very easily addressed inmho:
1.) NRG borders LEN. This does give the British player a major
advantage in taking Scanfinavia, as he will almost for sure have a
fleet sitting in NRG, which is in fact necessary to take Norway
Britain could take Norway via NTH, provided it gets minor power
support.
In any case, Britain need not gun for Norway in the first year.
London might decide to make more of a play for any of
Den/Net/Bel/Bre instead.
Perhaps the USSR could get the Brits to not enter NRG in return for
Uncle Joe doing Britain a favour in Spain or the Near-East.
Considering how Britain is bound to fear Turkish expansion into the
Near-East and have a considerable interest in having Spanish affairs
working out in a way amenable to Britain, I dare say Moscow has got
a number of diplomatic cards to play.
-
but does put constant pressure on LEN. a USSR fleet build LEN(nc)
in case you have an early gain is not only the most direct
declaration of war to britain, but cannot be used for anything
else than northern Scandinavia, while Soviet armies are
desperately needed everywhere on the map. Removing Len(nc) is not
an option, but reacing it via ARO and Finland (not to forget it's
baltic borders) should suffice to balance the region. Thus, I
would relocate NRG to not border LEN.
We'll have to agree to disagree there. I love that the Western-most
and Eastern-most powers are quite close to another in the Far North.
As they might ultimately be in the Near-East.
Gives you added diplomatic complexity and does justice to the high
Anglo-Soviet tensions during the interwar period.
2.)
The second,? I even think grave problem is the "claim" the map
gives Poland on the Baltic states, which makes it difficult to dip
about their fate.
Poland's in a pole-position regarding these two SCs. Much as say
Germany is when it comes to Denmark and the Netherlands. To expect
say an equal division of those two SCs, is to expect quite much.
That's like say Britain expecting to get Belgium in Standard. It
ain't the norm.
They
are polish home SC right now, and that will always make Poland
want them badly. It does in the end give you more flexibility to
build. Yet as three of them is much too much - it does neither
reflect Poland's situation in the era, nor does it by any means
reflect the importance of the SC that are flagged "build SC" in
the Baltic.
Poland's diplomatic position is not set in stone in this game.
Historically Poland horribly bungled its interwar diplomacy, if you
ask me. The "Jagiellonian dream" of establishing a Polish-led
power-block on territory once belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth wasn't a pipedream. In light of the precarious
independence many states gained on account of German and Russian
defeat, whilst those countries were bound to reemerge from a period
weakness, I think there indeed existed a quite compelling
pull-factor for these states to form a confederation led by the
region's most powerful state: Poland.
Of course, Poland made a royal mess of it by picking fights with
almost all her neighbours. That's what thwarted the Intermarum
project. I chose to not burden my Polish player with the same
unenlightened greed that kept such alliances and confederations
largely merely on the drawing-board.
Yet
simply removing one or two pink circles does not do the job for
me, as any expansion of both USSR and Poland will still result in
a clash there with units, that cannot be send elsewhere easily. So
what I would do redrawing the map is:
- Remove SC LAT completely. It didn't have that much importance
historically,
Riga's been a key city for centuries. Had Peter the Great taken
Riga, he'd have made that his capital, I understand. Saint
Petersburg was a poor substitute.
? and
for the sake of the game's balance in the region this serves as
well.
If one subscribes to the thesis that the balance is off in the first
place.
-
Create an SC EUK, not being a build SC for anyone.
- redraw WUK and STA so EUK does no longer touch Moscow.
- optional: redraw STA to not have an (wc) and make EUK a build SC
(home of the Black Sea fleet)
You might be interested to see how this part of the map looked like
in the variant's very first draft back in 2004. Sounds like it was a
mirror-image of what you propose (save for Latvia, that is):
As you can tell by the variant having evolved further, I didn't
particularly like this arrangement. I've long-since paired down both
the USSR and Germany to 3-SC powers. Works IMO much better and as I
read more about the times, the more comfortable I felt with me doing
so.
And
thus [a Sevastopol SC] serves to have another reason for Turkey
and USSR to fight over, as an IRAQ/IRAN agreement now can be done
too easily imho.
Easily done? I think the whole issue is very tricky for both Turkey
and the USSR.
Indeed, one reason why I scaled the USSR down to three SCs is that I
didn't like the then overly antagonistic Soviet-Turkish relations. I
wanted the Black Sea to be initially quiescent rather than a
battleground for F Sevastopol and F Ankara (the shift of the Turkish
fleet to Izmir is also one reason why I prefered a 3-SC Russia. Much
better there!).
As a
plus, it gives a strategic very important region the role it
deserves - just think of the battles of Sevastopol and Kharkov,
both EUk.
It's already pretty important a space. But if you look at the map,
you'll see that only the three major German objectives in the USSR
(Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad) have SC status. I happen to like
that.
Good discussion.
Cheers,
Charles |
| 1936: Suez, French Algeria and the wider Med - sunchung (Sep 17, 2010, 11:56 am) |
Charles and all,
I've been refraining from publicly commenting on my observations since 1) I'm probably colored by the actions in DC330 and would prefer to comment at the end of that game and 2) many of the observers are also in DC330 and even though the game seems to be heading towards the end stage, I wouldn't want to give anything too much away! [Note, I'm playing Britain in DC330, the v1.3 version of this variant]
However, I'll just make some comments limited to the start of the game, and in particular France.
There's been a lot of discussion here about France, and I personally have had a closer perspective on that power (although not as close as Nick!) I think I agree that France is a bit hampered, but not to the degree that has been expressed here. In DC330, Italy made a strong move to attack France from the start. Even though Italy had a tactical advantage, France as able to stymie Italy as long as Britain (myself) didn't intervene. However, the far flung army out in Beirut was treated as a bargaining chip only and didn't actually do much to dictate the events in the east.
But I think Beirut is an issue for France. If Turkey wanted to boot France out of the Mideast, France has no option BUT to appeal to Britain. And unless Britain steps up, France will lose Beirut. Italy is too far away to do something in year 1 and USSR could threaten Turkish space from the north, but again, it won't stop Turkey from taking Beirut. The fleet in Suez is the only potential help that France has. But this adds a weird dynamic in the sense that it commits France and Britain to be friendly in the main theater (Western) based upon the potential situation in a secondary theater (Near East). Also, unless Suez moves right away, again it'll arrive too late to help Beirut if Turkey moves two on that center.
I know in Diplomacy there are lots of situations where a power can commit more resources over a rival and who ever loses out in gaining the tempo advantage loses, but in this case France can only count on Britain to help out and forgo any other action. In a situation where France knew Turkey was going to attack him, France only has two options - bounce Turkey in Alexandretta or get British help to move Suez to the north. Normally that's not an issue, but here, France can't reinforce his position in Beirut. Again, without friendly British help. And so even if France guessed right and bounced Turkey from having two on Beirut, it'll only forestall it until the following year.
I think one potential option could be to have Iraq border Beirut and then France could use diplomacy to enlist other friendly powers to use DPs to aid Beirut in the case of a Turkish threat. But I guess it could cut both ways and Turkey or Britain can use the neutral to support an attack into Beirut with just one unit.
Net net, I don't know if the army in Beirut really aids France and actually hurts the French position since 1) France can only appeal to Britain if Turkey attacks his position and 2) if France loses out and still has his army there, it becomes a resource drain on France and 3) France has no way to reinforcing or reallocating that unit effectively by itself. In DC330, if France could rebuild a fleet or another army in his battle against Italy, then the results of the Italian/French war would've turned out differently.
Sun
2010/9/17 Charles Féaux de la Croix <charlesf(at)web.de>
I don't understand the proposed change to suez.
Jimmy, Suez becomes a British Home Supply Centre. In other words, it becomes a British build site.
I strongly recommend a French med fleet whether in Algiers or toulon/Marseilles
I've already noted in past mails why I've not chosen to do so. And it sure wouldn't help France's prospects. I'm sticking to the unit setup which follows in the footsteps of the 1900 variant. It believe it works best.
But with the promotion of Algiers to a French HSC, you'd be able to build a fleet there and have it sortie as early as Spring '37. Same is true for Marseilles, of course.
And yes, I remain a Dippy traditionalist in the naming of that space. In the case of Kiel/Hamburg I did however depart from the Standard mould. Just felt the more centrally located Hamburg looked better on the map than an awkwardly-perched Kiel.
Cheers,
Charles[Reply] |
| 1936: Suez, French Algeria and the wider Med - charlesf (Sep 17, 2010, 7:19 am) |
> I don't understand the proposed change to suez.
Jimmy, Suez becomes a British Home Supply Centre. In other words, it
becomes a British build site.
I strongly recommend a French med fleet whether in Algiers or toulon/Marseilles
I've already noted in past mails why I've not chosen to do so. And it
sure wouldn't help France's prospects. I'm sticking to the unit setup
which follows in the footsteps of the 1900 variant. It believe it works
best.
But with the promotion of Algiers to a French HSC, you'd be able to
build a fleet there and have it sortie as early as Spring '37. Same is
true for Marseilles, of course.
And yes, I remain a Dippy traditionalist in the naming of that space. In
the case of Kiel/Hamburg I did however depart from the Standard mould.
Just felt the more centrally located Hamburg looked better on the map
than an awkwardly-perched Kiel.
Cheers,
Charles[Reply] |
| 1936: Suez, French Algeria and the wider Med - charlesf (Sep 17, 2010, 5:55 am) |
Hi guys,
all this design talk has had me cast another critical look at the 1936
map. While I'm not in the least worried that the balance between Poland
and the Soviet Union might be off as many of you assert, I do hear what
you're saying about Turkey and France.
Yet the more I look at France's and Turkey's internal make-up and their
immediate surroundings, the more I remain convinced of the present
lay-of-the-land. There are very good reasons why say Lorraine's shaped
as it is, Paris and Marseilles don't adjoin another and Ankara abuts
Istanbul - just to name a few things I've re-examined.
So if I'm so very happy about say the space adjacencies in Turkey's
environs, what options other than redrawing the map might I use to reign
the Kemalist state in a bit? This train of thought had me consider the
basic issue that had allowed Turkey to rapidly consolidate her hold over
her Near-Eastern backyard:
Unlike on her Northern and Western flanks, the opposition to Turkish
expansion's rather soft towards the South. France's Lebanese garrison is
an isolated outpost and Britain might often lack the muscle or
motivation to go toe-to-toe with Turkey in a bid for Near-Eastern
hegemony. Now I do think Prime Ministers have neglected the Near-East to
their detriment. The region's readily reinforceable and promises
lucrative spoils.
But Britain will typically view this region of the map as subservient to
her interests closer to home. Why pick a fight with say Turkey or Italy
down there? Why not simply exchange Near-Eastern SCs for favours
elsewhere? Suez may in this context be appreciated for its strategic
value, but doesn't have much greater value to the Britain than any other
SC. So rather than the Suez Canal Zone serving as the lynchpin of
empire, British units might as well "migrate" elsewhere.
Clearly this wasn't doing justice to Britain's jealous guarding of the
Canal that connected her to the Crown Jewel of her empire, India, as
well as the white dominions in the Southern hemisphere. So turning Suez
into a British home SC struck me as both an adequate means of making
Turkey's expansion into her backyard more challenging as well as giving
Britain a more robust and more historical role in the Near-East.
Indeed, this had me thinking that my British grandfather's deployments
during WW2 nicely illustrated how the Suez Canal Zone (and also
Alexandria) served as a real pivot-point for British actions in the
region. Whether he was sent to Abyssinia, Syria, Greece or Libya, it was
always from there and always the point of return thereafter (iirc).
Gotta admit that I'm liking this simple change a lot! Turkey immediately
feels more constrained by British imperialism and more hemmed in. The
contemporary anti-imperialistic motivation comes more to the fore and
also had me rethink that Turkey's otherwise historically overly generous
allotment of three SCs might also well be seen as representing the fact
that nationalists throughout the Middle-East looked to the Kemalist
republic in their own anti-imperialist struggles. If you think of those
Turkish SCs partially representing that wider rising anti-imperialistic
movement down there, those three SCs no longer seem as a historical
stretch.
Next to the repercussions for Turkey, how might this change impact on
others? Obviously it enhances Britain's military capabilities, but also
complicates her diplomatic situation by having Turkey and to a lesser
extent Italy worry more about the British presence in the Near-East.
What about France? I'd argue it tends to strengthen France's hand as
this change is more likely to pull F Gibraltar towards the Near-East
than presently is the case. Also, the very fact that Suez then means
more to Britain also means that France gains a little more leverage on
Britain by the possible threat A Beirut presents to Suez.
I like to think this change turns Suez (sorta "India's outpost" into
something akin to what the Nationalists and Republicans mean to their
respective patron powers: considerable opportunity, but also additional
responsibility that might complicate wider diplomatic efforts.
FRENCH ALGERIA
An other idea also occurred to me (not sure which germinated first,
actually). How about also turning Algiers into a French home SC?
The historical rationale is clear. French Algeria was an integral part
of France, rather than having the status of a mere French colony. A good
10% of Algeria's population was ethnically European. So one might
elevate Algiers into being a proper home SC.
The question of course is whether that'd serve the game well. Were I to
go down that route, the map would have to be adjusted to reduce the
otherwise too great Franco-Italian tension.
Of course one could simply defuse tension over the Tyrrhenian by no
longer making it adjacent to Algiers. Yet I very much like this
anti-French opening alternative to probably the more common Ionian
opening. I want each and every unit in my variants to have multiple
viable openings rather than boring ole no-brainer default moves.
So, if not defusing Franco-Italian tension in that manner, how else
might one go about it?
One way to go about it would be to split the Tyrrhenian into a Northern
and a Southern space between Sardinia and Naples. That'd make what then
would be the Southern Tyrrhenian into less of a hot-spot as Rome would
be shielded by the Northern Tyrrhenian.
This measure might be accompanied by good ole Tuscany being restored.
A more indirect measure I'm contemplating gives Italy a more Eastern
bent: Redrawing the Adriatic Sea to touch Greece! This would make Greece
more of a concern to Italy than it already is as it'd not only serve an
enemy (i.e. Turkey) as a spring-board into the Ionian, but also into the
Adriatic! So that further heighten Turkish-Italian tension.
Now having outlined the possible follow-on changes upon a move to grant
Algiers HSC status, I do have to say that I remain undecided whether
this whole measure's the way to go or not (unlike the Suez change, which
I'm very bullish about). So I especially appeal to you guys to say what
you think about such a change and its ripple-effects.
Cheers,
Charles[Reply] |
| 1936: Suez, French Algeria and the wider Med (dc319) charlesf Sep 17, 07:19 am |
> I don't understand the proposed change to suez.
Jimmy, Suez becomes a British Home Supply Centre. In other words, it
becomes a British build site.
I strongly recommend a French med fleet whether in Algiers or toulon/Marseilles
I've already noted in past mails why I've not chosen to do so. And it
sure wouldn't help France's prospects. I'm sticking to the unit setup
which follows in the footsteps of the 1900 variant. It believe it works
best.
But with the promotion of Algiers to a French HSC, you'd be able to
build a fleet there and have it sortie as early as Spring '37. Same is
true for Marseilles, of course.
And yes, I remain a Dippy traditionalist in the naming of that space. In
the case of Kiel/Hamburg I did however depart from the Standard mould.
Just felt the more centrally located Hamburg looked better on the map
than an awkwardly-perched Kiel.
Cheers,
Charles |
| 1936: Suez, French Algeria and the wider Med (dc319) sunchung Sep 17, 11:56 am |
Charles and all,
I've been refraining from publicly commenting on my observations since 1) I'm probably colored by the actions in DC330 and would prefer to comment at the end of that game and 2) many of the observers are also in DC330 and even though the game seems to be heading towards the end stage, I wouldn't want to give anything too much away! [Note, I'm playing Britain in DC330, the v1.3 version of this variant]
However, I'll just make some comments limited to the start of the game, and in particular France.
There's been a lot of discussion here about France, and I personally have had a closer perspective on that power (although not as close as Nick!) I think I agree that France is a bit hampered, but not to the degree that has been expressed here. In DC330, Italy made a strong move to attack France from the start. Even though Italy had a tactical advantage, France as able to stymie Italy as long as Britain (myself) didn't intervene. However, the far flung army out in Beirut was treated as a bargaining chip only and didn't actually do much to dictate the events in the east.
But I think Beirut is an issue for France. If Turkey wanted to boot France out of the Mideast, France has no option BUT to appeal to Britain. And unless Britain steps up, France will lose Beirut. Italy is too far away to do something in year 1 and USSR could threaten Turkish space from the north, but again, it won't stop Turkey from taking Beirut. The fleet in Suez is the only potential help that France has. But this adds a weird dynamic in the sense that it commits France and Britain to be friendly in the main theater (Western) based upon the potential situation in a secondary theater (Near East). Also, unless Suez moves right away, again it'll arrive too late to help Beirut if Turkey moves two on that center.
I know in Diplomacy there are lots of situations where a power can commit more resources over a rival and who ever loses out in gaining the tempo advantage loses, but in this case France can only count on Britain to help out and forgo any other action. In a situation where France knew Turkey was going to attack him, France only has two options - bounce Turkey in Alexandretta or get British help to move Suez to the north. Normally that's not an issue, but here, France can't reinforce his position in Beirut. Again, without friendly British help. And so even if France guessed right and bounced Turkey from having two on Beirut, it'll only forestall it until the following year.
I think one potential option could be to have Iraq border Beirut and then France could use diplomacy to enlist other friendly powers to use DPs to aid Beirut in the case of a Turkish threat. But I guess it could cut both ways and Turkey or Britain can use the neutral to support an attack into Beirut with just one unit.
Net net, I don't know if the army in Beirut really aids France and actually hurts the French position since 1) France can only appeal to Britain if Turkey attacks his position and 2) if France loses out and still has his army there, it becomes a resource drain on France and 3) France has no way to reinforcing or reallocating that unit effectively by itself. In DC330, if France could rebuild a fleet or another army in his battle against Italy, then the results of the Italian/French war would've turned out differently.
Sun
2010/9/17 Charles Féaux de la Croix <charlesf(at)web.de>
I don't understand the proposed change to suez.
Jimmy, Suez becomes a British Home Supply Centre. In other words, it becomes a British build site.
I strongly recommend a French med fleet whether in Algiers or toulon/Marseilles
I've already noted in past mails why I've not chosen to do so. And it sure wouldn't help France's prospects. I'm sticking to the unit setup which follows in the footsteps of the 1900 variant. It believe it works best.
But with the promotion of Algiers to a French HSC, you'd be able to build a fleet there and have it sortie as early as Spring '37. Same is true for Marseilles, of course.
And yes, I remain a Dippy traditionalist in the naming of that space. In the case of Kiel/Hamburg I did however depart from the Standard mould. Just felt the more centrally located Hamburg looked better on the map than an awkwardly-perched Kiel.
Cheers,
Charles |
| DC319: More variant discussion - dknemeyer (Sep 16, 2010, 4:38 pm) |
Hi Folks,
Some responses to Charles' questions on the variant:
- 18 VPs required to solo rather than 15 (I am as yet not sure what'd make for the ideal victory threshold and am hence especially curious about how you view the matter).
I think more testing is necessary to ascertain the ideal victory threshold, but I think it is clear that for *Diplomacy* - a game with the stated objective of a solo victory - 15 is broken. I look forward to seeing how 18 plays out in dc330.
All of these changes have a considerable impact on the powers' positions. (See the attached map further below.)
I think the new map is a marked improvement, but I don't think it solves the balance issues. While we may be responding to too small of a data size I am hearing consistency among the players as to which are over/under powered.
I was concerned that the Polish-Soviet relationship was overly antagonistic and war at some point unavoidable. I think both Poland's now greater proximity to Germany and the (Western) Ukraine not being as critical space as it was before, makes a constructive Warsaw-Moscow relationship far more viable.
While again a data point of 1, it didn't seem to matter in dc330.
The increased German-Italian tension (and Germany's greater proximity to Poland) also improves France's diplomatic position, I am convinced. Is it enough to avoid France also doing poorly in future? I genuinely believe so. Yet one possible way to further help France might be to make Marseille and Paris adjacent. Thoughts?
I prefer the notion of a Parisian fleet in the Med. At least one.
As for the "Spanish Question", it's by no means a given that either faction will ever emerge as the master of Spain's three SCs. Far too many sharks in the tank... A long stalemate or the Iberian peninsula falling under the sway of the original great powers strike me as at least as likely outcomes. To no little extent because I generally judge it in Britain's and France's interests not to let either faction emerge as a major player (btw, in DC330, the Republicans trounced the Nationalists and have united the country). Indeed, I'd suggest both France and Britain having done poorly in DC319, has much to do what role they chose to play in the Spanish peninsula.
Among Jimmy's many interesting ideas was the notion of having Spain be special but ultimately a neutral power and not controlled by any one player. There was some really nice thinking there.
There are many excellent observers on this list and it would be interesting to hear some of their perspectives, too.
Dirk[Reply] |
| DC319: More variant discussion - charlesf (Sep 13, 2010, 7:23 pm) |
Hi guys,
I've much enjoyed both Joao's and Dirk's detailed EOGs, both
regarding DC319 and the variant itself. Just thought I'd weigh in on
the variant discussion before publishing the full EOG report. To
this end, let me remind you that the variant further evolved
following the start of this particular playtest. I'd be interested
in whether you feel the same concerns you've voiced also apply to
that somewhat different setup.
Let me summarise those changes as compared to DC319's v1.1:
- 18 VPs required to solo rather than 15 (I am as yet not sure
what'd make for the ideal victory threshold and am hence especially
curious about how you view the matter).
- Germany and Italy have edged closer to another owing to Rome being
immediately adjacent to Austria (both as I wanted to heighten
Italo-German friction and because I wanted Italy to have the same
strong influence over Austrian affairs as she had in history).
- Germany and Poland have equally edged closer together as Berlin
now borders Poland's Greater Poland "soft-spot".
- Poland and the USSR are now not as close to another as the Ukraine
was divided in two, thus ensuring Stalingrad is more than two moves
away from Cracow.
All of these changes have a considerable impact on the powers'
positions. (See the attached map further below.)
I was concerned that the Polish-Soviet relationship was overly
antagonistic and war at some point unavoidable. I think both
Poland's now greater proximity to Germany and the (Western) Ukraine
not being as critical space as it was before, makes a constructive
Warsaw-Moscow relationship far more viable.
The increased German-Italian tension (and Germany's greater
proximity to Poland) also improves France's diplomatic position, I
am convinced. Is it enough to avoid France also doing poorly in
future? I genuinely believe so. Yet one possible way to further help
France might be to make Marseille and Paris adjacent. Thoughts?
As for the "Spanish Question", it's by no means a given that either
faction will ever emerge as the master of Spain's three SCs. Far too
many sharks in the tank... A long stalemate or the Iberian peninsula
falling under the sway of the original great powers strike me as at
least as likely outcomes. To no little extent because I generally
judge it in Britain's and France's interests not to let either
faction emerge as a major player (btw, in DC330, the Republicans
trounced the Nationalists and have united the country). Indeed, I'd
suggest both France and Britain having done poorly in DC319, has
much to do what role they chose to play in the Spanish peninsula.
In any case, I don't share Dirk's concern that a strong Nationalist
Spain emerging is gamey. Indeed, I'd say that Franco might have well
accomplished the same as Dirk's Nationalist Spain, had he joined the
Axis powers in 1940. Only Hitler not offering Franco quite the juicy
deal the Caudillo was looking out for, kept Spain out of the war.
But had it entered, chances are Gibraltar and Morocco would soon
have been Spanish. Spain would have then indeed been a major force.
So why shouldn't it happen in this variant?
Indeed, had the great powers not judged the outcome of the Spanish
civil war of the gravest consequences, they'd have hardly plowed in
the resources some of them did (and France would have had, had it
not been stopped in doing so by domestic right-wing opposition). The
European balance of power was on the line. Nobody expected the
victor to later remain neutral in a wider continental war...
As for Germany rather than Italy being the Nationalists' patron
power, one of the reasons I chose Italy over Germany was that I felt
this had the most desirable impact on the British stance on the
Spanish Question. With the present setup, I can see Britain adopting
anything from a pro-Republican to a pro-Nationalist stance (as
befits historical realities). Were Germany however the patron power,
it'd give Britain more of a pro-Republican bent than I'd want her to
have.
Okay, I'll stop short here before this mail becomes too long. I'd
love to see further discussion on the variant - with an eye to
DC319's version, the new 1.3 version and possible future changes. We
designers need people to challenge our assumptions and benefit from
out-of-the-box thinking we ourselves might not be able to provide.
Cheers,
Charles[Reply] |
| DC319: More variant discussion (dc319) dknemeyer Sep 16, 04:38 pm |
Hi Folks,
Some responses to Charles' questions on the variant:
- 18 VPs required to solo rather than 15 (I am as yet not sure what'd make for the ideal victory threshold and am hence especially curious about how you view the matter).
I think more testing is necessary to ascertain the ideal victory threshold, but I think it is clear that for *Diplomacy* - a game with the stated objective of a solo victory - 15 is broken. I look forward to seeing how 18 plays out in dc330.
All of these changes have a considerable impact on the powers' positions. (See the attached map further below.)
I think the new map is a marked improvement, but I don't think it solves the balance issues. While we may be responding to too small of a data size I am hearing consistency among the players as to which are over/under powered.
I was concerned that the Polish-Soviet relationship was overly antagonistic and war at some point unavoidable. I think both Poland's now greater proximity to Germany and the (Western) Ukraine not being as critical space as it was before, makes a constructive Warsaw-Moscow relationship far more viable.
While again a data point of 1, it didn't seem to matter in dc330.
The increased German-Italian tension (and Germany's greater proximity to Poland) also improves France's diplomatic position, I am convinced. Is it enough to avoid France also doing poorly in future? I genuinely believe so. Yet one possible way to further help France might be to make Marseille and Paris adjacent. Thoughts?
I prefer the notion of a Parisian fleet in the Med. At least one.
As for the "Spanish Question", it's by no means a given that either faction will ever emerge as the master of Spain's three SCs. Far too many sharks in the tank... A long stalemate or the Iberian peninsula falling under the sway of the original great powers strike me as at least as likely outcomes. To no little extent because I generally judge it in Britain's and France's interests not to let either faction emerge as a major player (btw, in DC330, the Republicans trounced the Nationalists and have united the country). Indeed, I'd suggest both France and Britain having done poorly in DC319, has much to do what role they chose to play in the Spanish peninsula.
Among Jimmy's many interesting ideas was the notion of having Spain be special but ultimately a neutral power and not controlled by any one player. There was some really nice thinking there.
There are many excellent observers on this list and it would be interesting to hear some of their perspectives, too.
Dirk |
| dc319: EOG Italy/Nationalist Spain - dknemeyer (Sep 13, 2010, 2:39 pm) |
First, thanks to Charles for creating the variant and GMing the game. In both of these contributions you are giving to us players and the community, and I certainly appreciate it. Following Joao's lead I'm going to talk about both the game as well as my thoughts on the variant, which I have also shared with Charles:
THE GAME
As I've written elsewhere I am not a very good strategic player. My other skills get me by a lot of times, but in this game my strategy was limited to the players and relationships, largely ignoring the map and SCs. Three of the players in this game were known quantities to me - Britain, France and Soviet Union - while the other three were not. I decided to base my strategy around the outcomes I wanted with the people I was familiar with.
Of those three, I had played and cooperated well with Britain before. France I knew only from observing his first round Winter Blitz game this year and being impressed with/concerned by how strong he seemed to be in every facet of the game. The Soviets I knew both as an opponent and as one of the top few rated players at DC; he and I had a mixed record in playing together. Using this as a starting point I set out to befriend Britain and find a good win-win approach to the game, as I felt he would be reliable. I figured we would see the end to a draw or one of us with a solo. Then, I would try and play against both France and the Soviets. In the former case, by agreeing to a deal that would leave him exposed to Britain and I right off the bat to take advantage of; in the latter case to try and manipulate control of Spain to my advantage. The other players, at least in the early game, were to be ancillary and simply managed while I worked to capture Spain and neuter France.
From that pre-game there were basically five phases of the game for me:
I. When the pre-game plans went almost perfectly to form. This was the first year, where Britain and I coordinated well and dropped the hammer on France, while I was able to manage all my other relationships well enough to be not otherwise threatened. Feeling very bullish.
II. When, for Spring 1937, France convinced Britain to stab me and it appeared this game would be an absolutely disastrous result. Clearly the low water mark.
III. After intense, strenuous, and carefully crafted press I managed to bring Britain back onto my side and in Fall 1937 we devastated France with a truly surprise attack. Not only did this put me back in a strong position, but it made France despise Britain and identify positively with me.
IV. After Wesaq's bid for a solo was thwarted - the solo chance being enabled when the Soviets had a fit for losing Spain and literally handed all of their centers to Poland and Turkey - a period of jockeying for positions and relationships ensued. The heart attack of Spring 1937 notwithstanding this was the worst part of the game for me: GP were melded together into one single power so, when Germany and I had continued communication and personality conflicts, it kept me on the wrong end of their very powerful position. While I was a good, strong power my position was flawed - even fatally, if GPT has perfectly cooperated - and my poor British ally was in an even worse position.
V. The players realized that the game would almost certainly be a solo or a 4-way draw - thanks to the low 15 SC victory threshold - and we went through a rather trying period of sorting that out. I tried to make a case for a 3-way draw - using the .5 value Spanish SC - but GP stayed rock steady and ended up flipping France on me to force the issue on the 4-way. I had the good sense to realize I was playing a bad hand at that point and negotiated myself into the 4-way instead of France, at the expense of my game-long ally Britain - now played by a replacement player whom I was also really enjoying working with. Sorry David!
While I found the first few years of this game thrilling the last three or four were not much fun. I'm not sure if that is the product of my generally liking early games in Dip better than mid or late, or if the 15 SC victory threshold just sucked the thrill out of a variety of possible results out of things too early, or if my position was so strategically flawed that I was always playing off my back foot. It will, for me, be memorable for managing to flip Britain back in Fall 1937. That is easily the high water mark of the diplomatic side of my Dip playing in my short time in the game.
In retrospect I think we had a talented group of Dippers around the board. While perhaps not a "great" table it was a "good" one with very capable players at each position. Despite being well-played I think each of us made what I consider glaring mistakes: I was strategically rudderless from the beginning; Poland and Turkey both played much too conservative in the mid-to-late games - I even think the former could have soloed with a more forward policy; France and Germany both rubbed others the wrong way with their press in ways that at least I for one was able to capitalize on; Britain's flip-flop-flip made France his undying enemy too early in the game and crippled his chances to break out; the Soviets just flat quit. I suppose if any of us had played a better game and avoided our flaw(s) we would be talking about a dramatic solo victory right now as opposed to a milquetoast 4-way.
I really enjoyed playing with all of the players in this game and felt like I was playing with Dippers of similar skill and ability. That's always fun.
THE VARIANT
As to the variant, there is a lot to like about it. The Spanish Civil War mechanic is brilliant, especially in the early game. DP variants are a lot of fun so that was another plus. There was a lot of thought put into the map and various historical choices which I really appreciate. This is a hallmark of Charles' designs.
On the other hand, I have pretty serious balance concerns. Albeit in a very small sample size, it seems to be terribly imbalanced. PT have participated in a draw each time this has been run (including 1926, the earlier variant this built into), the Soviets have always been first out, and the French are beaten into obscurity early on. Now, it has only been a few games played so that certainly is a factor. I've shared my thoughts and suggestions with Charles and he was wholly unimpressed, so I won't revisit the particulars once again here. But I do think that the variant would benefit from some nerfing to Poland and Turkey, and removing one of Britain's two wayward fleets and replacing it with the boring ol' A LVP. Taken together these changes would make the Soviet position far more viable and give France more options.
I also wonder about the realism of the mid-game Spanish Civil War position and beyond. My ability to build Spain into perhaps my primary power felt really gamey. I suppose having a Turkey get 13 SC by 1940 also isn't realistic and perhaps my issue is more with this mechanic in Dip than anything specific to the variant.
Thanks again Charles and all of my worthy antagonists.
Dirk[Reply] |
| DC319: F EOG - jlqueiros (Sep 11, 2010, 6:23 pm) |
1. First of all, let me congratulate Charles for creating a great variant. The map reconfigurations, the DP's, the Spanish factions, it's all great fun. Being great doesn't mean it can't be improved and I made many (certainly too many ) suggestions to Charles during the game. More on that later.
Personally, it was a very frustrating experience. I wasn't able to create one single equal-terms alliance relationship - that's kind of a record for me. Probably, much of it was due to my own mistakes. But I'm convinced some of it was also due to France's weak early position in the game, namely vis-a-vis Italy/Nationalist Spain (which in this case was particularly painful since Italy was played by Dirk, one of the best diplomacy players I've met in years). Being France, most of the suggestions I made to Charles were regarding possible corrections to this imbalance. Here's what I wrote to him even before the first turn:
"Charles,
As said before, I think France has vulnerabilities that at least Britain and Italy don't have. Italy has almost free access to the Magreb with Tri-Tun/SAl and Nap-Tys. I can only defend Alg through help of Britain or DP's to Mor, none of them very certain. Britain can put 2 fleets in the first turn bordering Bre - and that's something!
France has no fleets to be an effective counter-menace to Italy and, what's worse, Italy doesn't have any other "natural" enemy to which France can appeal on the first years - both the German and Turkish units are too far.
So, since this is a test, a few ideas to balance F and I a bit more, might be to put a fleet in Mar instead of an army, to change Tys in order not to border Alg or to transform Egy and Suez into only one territory under british rule.
It could also make sense to have Lor border with Bel. Besides of being more accurate, it would allow France to have a 2-units access to Bel without moving into british-protected-area Eng. And would make a German attack more difficult - remember that historically they had to move through Belgium. Finally, and these are just ideas for your consideration, the prohibition of supports between Franco's and Republican units would make Bre-Swa, Mar-Cat to take Mad more appealing to France."
Just to finish this chapter on suggestions to improve the variant, I also ventured the possibility of Nationalist Spain being proxied by Germany instead of Italy.
It should also be noticed that the whole DP's system gets irrelevant once most neutrals were conquered. One possibility to continue using the DP's system would be to create some kind of insurrection simulation on conquered territories. For example, a 5 DP's plus in a conquered neutral without any occupation unit would recreate the original unit, therefore costing an sc to the occupying great power that was unable to use its diplomacy to counter patriot insurrections. A bit like Churchill's support to Tito in Yugoslavia.
Finally, I'm a bit skeptic regarding the low victory threshold. I can't help notice that with the 15 sc threshold, Germany would have won WWII. But even in gaming terms, I believe that it was the low threshold that made everybody lose some interest in the final phase of the game. 2-ways and 3-ways are not possible. Trying solos is too risky, since it forces negative coalitions where members are themselves too close of the solo. That's why everybody accepted the 4-way draw as soon as it was proposed. A bigger threshold, that allows at least 3-way DIAS with tactical stalemate lines might make the medium and end-phases of the game more interesting.
Anyway, these are just ideas for Charles, in the spirit of a test game. They don't contradict the main point: it's a great variant. Congrats, Charles.
2. Regarding my early strategy, the simplest way is to go back to what I wrote to the GM, at his request, before the first turn. Shortly, the idea was to avoid being attacked by Italy and Germany and forming an alliance with Britain. As you can see, I foresaw from the start the probability of a BI alliance against me. Charles asked me why, if I foresaw the BI, didn't I opened offensively against them. Simple: If I had done that than the BI would be certain after Sp1936, even if I was wrong in the first place. So I just hoped I was wrong. I wasn't and I was finished. I did what anybody does when faced with a invincible enemy alliance - I maneuvered in such a way that one party of the alliance, in this case Italy, would gain more that the other part. In result, Britain changed sides and I believed a comeback was possible. But shortly afterwards Britain stabbed me again - quite incredible, I must say. It was partly my fault: The plan I had devised gave Britain and me 2 sc's each for certain that year. It was devised in such a way that each of us would gain 1 sc each turn. But then Germany came with some idea of passing through Lor (saying he wanted to conquer Swi) and I needed therefore to maintain an army near Par to avoid a possible German stab. In order to do that, I couldn't conquer my sc (Bel) on Spring. I therefore proposed a change of plans to Britain, whereby he would get his 2 sc's on Spring and I would get my 2 sc's on Fall. He got his 2 sc's and then stabbed me... It's curious. It was a simple suggestion, who knows why, from Germany regarding the possibility of moving to Lor (which we withdrew in the final moment, after Britain and I already had changed our plans), that allowed Italy to lure Britain back to his side and, in the end, destroyed France.
Anyway, here's my answer to Charles, before the opening turn, on what my strategy and expectation were:
"Now on your questions:
Biggest early prize and offensive priority: Iberia, with its 4 sc's - makes a lot of defensive sense too, since a 3-units Italian (the nightmare scenario) or Russian controlled Iberia would be a definitive danger for France's southern flank - only Britain could come to rescue in such a scenario.
Biggest defensive headache: Italy, with its almost free access to Alg and Mor and its Iberian position. The fact that France has no fleets in the Med makes the defense of Alg/Mar very difficult.
Best possible ally: Britain - cooperation between the two can go a long way and bring a lot of gains. The problem is that an IB alliance would be terminal for France. The fact that both of them accepted my suggestions without alterations and that both of them say they're too busy to negotiate these weekend is a bit worrying. Can only hope for the best.
Other considerations: French/German friction is low. An early German attack is not very likely. Nonetheless, Jimmy's lack of preference for a southeastern historically accurate opening is also a bit worrying. The facts that I can't build in Bei and Alg and that these are armies (with low projection force and difficult to move around) transforms both the Magreb and the Middle East more into bargaining chips than in real growth assets.
So, as you saw, my diplomatic moves were the following:
1. Try to have a plan with Russia for Iberia should Italy be hostile. The fact that Italy said he was not interested in Iberia made this plan less interesting, but I might to have still to come back to it should his moves not fit his words.
2. Try to get a peaceful arrangement with Italy. Using the Magreb as a bargaining chip, I give it to him (he could conquer it by force anyway) in exchange of peace (having him moving east) and a French stake in Iberia. Lets see if it worked...
3. Convincing Britain to form an effective offensive alliance. Using Syria as a bargaining chip, I help him to control the Middle East in exchange of peace and him recognizing my stakes over Iberia, Magreb and Western Med. DMZ's from Eng to Gib would make the defensive part of the alliance pretty stable, while giving him a good Britain-Middle East route (that he can use better than me because he has fleets and I have armies). That would mean a 7/7 sc powerbase for each of us with clear growth routes afterwards (Germany for both of us, Scandinavia for him and Italy/Magreb for me). The gains are good and balanced and I hope he truly accepted the idea. The only cloud is that a BI offensive alliance is equally appealing for him.
4. Having a DMZ-agreement with Germany.
Tomorrow I'll know how it has worked."
It didn't...
3. The end-game: I was a dormant Italian puppet and decided to become a more active PG puppet. Why? I wrote a long message to Wesaq on that and it's easier to reproduce it here - see below. Anyway, the main result of my decision seems to have been that PGT convinced Italy to accept the 4-way draw. You'll notice from the 4th paragraph that I was aware of the logical fault on the whole reasoning why to accept the PG proposal: Italy, or even Britain, would be better partners for PGT to get the 4-way draw then I could ever be. So the only hope was that their relationship was so bad that they actually weren't choices. Obviously, that was not the case. Even so, it was a slight possibility worth exploring.
On being played by PG on this, I can't say it was a pleasant experience. They made me waste much more time than reasonable. And, most importantly, it was not worth it. They would have convinced Italy on the 4-way draw sooner or later. There was no need to play me.
Here's the letter, just out of curiosity:
"Wesaq,
We haven't spoken lately. I was a sort of dormant player in the last turns. You remember how I was butchered by BI in the game start. I hope my former silence will compensate the time I'm now taking from you with this very long message
I kind of woke up due to a quite interesting proposal by Kyle and Jimmy. They pointed out that, with a very low 15sc threshold for the solo and 50 sc's on the whole, this variant can't end up in a 2 or a 3 way DIAS, since 3*15<50. Regarding solos, it was made clear by your attempt a few years ago that this game has good and alert players, which means that any attempt will always result in a negative coalition that will defeat it.
Therefore, the only other possibility is a 4-way DIAS: 13,13,13,11 or 13,13,12,12. It seems Dirk tried to point out that the 3-way DIAS is also possible, due to the tweak that spanish-held sc's only count 1/2 for I and S. This could only happen with a 14, 14, 14.5 (15 spanish sc's + 7 italian sc's) formula or something similar. The reason I don't believe this could work is not so much the fact that Dirk, with 22 units, would be a formidable force that could easily conquer another sc and solo. Maybe one could find stalemate lines in this variant for such a formula and avoid that risk. The point is that, even if the stalemate line can be and is formed, it would never engage all of Dirk's forces. This means he would only need to exchange a spanish sc for an italian sc on his side of the stalemate line to solo. He would obviously do it. That's why the only alternative to a solo is a 4-way DIAS.
Due to Italy's refusal and Britain's allegiance to Italy, Kyle and Jimmy chose me to be the 4th partner in a TPGF DIAS. I know it sounds crazy, since it implies I have to grow from my current 2 sc's to 11 or 12 sc's. It was exactly because it is crazy, or, if you prefer, bold and difficult, that I accepted the plan and woke up of my dormant status.
One might say that the biggest difficulty in the plan is not for me to grow from 2 to 11 sc's. It might be the idea that, while I'm doing this with your help, none of you 3 goes for the solo. But this is, I do believe, the best part of the plan. I assume the 3 of you are playing for the solo. I always assume that any diplomacy good and rational player wants to go for the solo and only accepts a draw if he has no chance to get the solo. But the fact is that, if we design and implement a plan for a 4-way, at least 3 (TPG) of the 4 will very close to the solo, with 12, 13 sc's. Since we're talking about 3 very good players, I believe we can also assume that the mistake of allowing someone to automatically solo by stabbing will never happen. On the other hand, a stab would create an imbalance in the 4-way alliance that would inevitably result in a solo by one of the two other 12/13 sc's players reacting defensively against the stabber. Putting it shortly, if any of you 3 stabs, he knows he'll lose and will be giving the solo to one of the other two.
We probably can't build strong stalemate lines along all the borders between the 4 of us. This means that the DIAS will not be justified by a stalemate, as often happens in standard, but by the realization by the 4 of us that we can't be the first stabber, because the first stabber is the only one who is sure he will not be the winner. A diplomatic, strategic draw, instead of a tactical draw. Interesting stuff.
It is on the basis of this tension - the fact that each of you three knows he can't be the first stabber - that I actually believe this plan can work. At the very least, it will be a very interesting social and gaming experiment.
It was in order to reinforce one of the premises of the whole idea, the one that assumes that the TPGF alliance will never do the mistake of tactically allowing an automatic solo for the first stabber, that the suggestion of establishing a 12sc limit for PGT until F gets to 9, 10 sc's emerged. A limit I believe you agreed with.
So this is the general idea Kyle and Jimmy presented to me, the one I accepted and one I hope you're interested in, since it takes 4 to tango in this particular case.
If that's the case, allow me to point out the tactical circumstances of another of the premises - the one that says that I can grow from 2 to 11/12 sc's. This is already quite difficult as things stand. It would be impossible if B and I are allowed to have builds in the next few turns. This turn, B and I can only grow in 2 places: Cro, if you don't support Germany with Ser S Cro, and Sue, if you don't order Ara S Sue, Sue h (and move Ira-Pal in order to be able to simultaneously cut Egy with Sue and defend Sue - Ara S Pal-Sue - next year). These are the only two vulnerable spots on the whole board, if a BI v. TPGF is in place.
If BI get these 2 builds, or even just 1 of them, I'm dead. That is, you see, why it so important for the whole plan that you protect Cro and Sue this year."
5. Quite long, Charles, but I hope it can be helpful. Thanks for having me in this test. I'm looking forward to playing 1936 again. With better results.
I hope I'll find some of the great co-players in this game in future challenges. Am I a revengeful person? We'll see.
Best regards,
João
[Reply] |
| DC319: Game Over! - charlesf (Sep 10, 2010, 11:31 am) |
Hi guys,
our little continental war is over. Indeed, had it not been for an
email glitch, I'd have had already a unanimous four-way GIPT vote
prior to Spring '43.
The "BIG FOUR" (Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey) met at Schloß
Charlottenhof in Potsdam, rejoicing at being considered the
leading powers in Europe.
Now, it's been a pleasure serving as the GM for such a fine group
of players and thank you all for both your patience and exemplary
spirit you brought to the game. Congrats everyone.
I shall publish an EOG report summary next week. I'd ask you to
submit your EOGs by Wednesday. I'd be grateful were you to also
include your take on the variant. Should you have any suggestions
as to what might be amiss or how 1936 could be improved, I'd love
to hear those thoughts.
I hope you all had a good time, whatever fate befell your nation.
Cheers,
Charles
----------
PLAYERS:
BRITAIN: DavidCheGould <davidchegould(at)bigpond.com>
FRANCE: Joao Queiros <jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com>
GERMANY: Ghostine, Jimmy <Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org>
ITALY & NAT. SPAIN: Dirk Knemeyer dirk(at)knemeyer.com
POLAND: Kyle Overby-Lee <tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com>
SOVIET UNION & REP. SPAIN: Nigel Phillips
<nephilli99(at)hotmail.com> (eliminated Winter 193
TURKEY: Repu Maoni <wesaq(at)list.ru>
HEADLINES:
o PEACE CONFERENCE LEADS TO END OF HOSTILITIES
PIC OF THE WEEK: Picasso's "Face of Peace".[Reply] |
| DC319: Spring 1943 Moves - charlesf (Sep 09, 2010, 5:56 am) |
Hi guys,
first off, peace negotiations at a Swiss spa have been adjourned
without any tangible results having been achieved. Shall our
little continental war outlast WW2? Well, we're now already past
El-Alamein and Stalingrad...
Talking of the historical timeline, we're witnessing something
of a D-Day in reverse as many a nation has made it on to British
instead of Norman shores. Quite a kaleidoscope of colours!
In France, Paris Taxis haven't saved the French capital this
time over. Rundstedt's panzers defeated the last intact French
army and are now rolling triumphantly along the Champs Elysées.
On other fronts, no hostile action has been reported among the
"Big Four" - unless we count the "changing of the guards" at
Edinburgh Castle.
Britain's retreat is due this Friday, while Fall 1943 is
scheduled for Wednesday, 15 September.
Cheers,
Charles
----------
PLAYERS:
BRITAIN: DavidCheGould <davidchegould(at)bigpond.com>
FRANCE: Joao Queiros <jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com>
GERMANY: Ghostine, Jimmy <Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org>
ITALY & NAT. SPAIN: Dirk Knemeyer dirk(at)knemeyer.com
POLAND: Kyle Overby-Lee <tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com>
SOVIET UNION & REP. SPAIN: Nigel Phillips
<nephilli99(at)hotmail.com> (eliminated Winter 193
TURKEY: Repu Maoni <wesaq(at)list.ru>
HEADLINES:
o WESTERN POWERS TAKE ANOTHER HIT
PRESS: None. 
ORDERS:
Britain:
F Brest - South-Western Approaches (*Bounce*)
F Yorkshire - North Sea (*Bounce*)
F English Channel Supports F Brest - South-Western
Approaches (*Dislodged*)
France:
F London - North Sea (*Bounce*)
A Paris - Lorraine (*Disbanded*)
Germany:
A Austria Supports A Czechia
F Belgium Supports F North Sea - English Channel
A Croatia Supports A Hungary
A Czechia Supports A Austria
F Denmark - North Sea (*Bounce*)
A Hamburg - Rhineland
A Hungary Supports A Croatia
A Lorraine - Paris
A Munich - Lorraine
A Picardy Supports A Lorraine - Paris
F North Sea - English Channel
Italy:
A Burgundy Supports A Switzerland
A Gascony - Brest (*Fails*)
A Slovenia - Rome
A Switzerland Supports A Burgundy
F Tripoli Hold
F Adriatic Sea Hold
Poland:
A Archangel Supports A Finland - Leningrad
A Cracow Supports A Rumania
F Edinburgh - Liverpool
A Finland - Leningrad
F Leningrad(nc) - Arctic Ocean
A Moscow - Byelorussia
A Norway Hold
A Rumania Supports A Transylvania
A Slovakia Supports A Austria
A Transylvania Supports A Serbia
A Warsaw Hold
Turkey:
A Bulgaria Supports A Serbia
F Dodecanese Hold
A Greece Supports A Serbia
A Iraq - Palestine
A Kurdistan - Ankara
A Serbia Hold
F Stalingrad(wc) Hold
A Suez - Egypt
F Aegean Sea Hold
F Arabian Sea Hold
F Eastern Mediterranean Hold
Nationalist_Spain:
A Piedmont Supports A Switzerland
F Atlantic Ocean - South-Western Approaches
(*Bounce*)
F Ionian Sea Hold
F Norwegian Sea - Edinburgh
F South-Western Approaches - Bay of Biscay
PENDING RETREAT:
British F English Channel can retreat to Irish Sea
or Wales.
SUPPLY CENTER OWNERSHIP (Winter
1942):
Britain(3): Brest, Egypt, Liverpool.
France(2): London, Paris.
Germany(11): Austria, Belgium, Berlin, Croatia,
Czechia, Denmark, Hamburg, Hungary, Munich,
Netherlands, Sweden.
Italy(7): Algiers, Marseille, Milan, Naples, Rome,
Switzerland, Tripoli.
Poland(11): Cracow, Edinburgh, Finland, Gdynia,
Latvia, Leningrad, Lithuania, Moscow, Norway, Rumania,
Warsaw.
Turkey(11): Ankara, Beirut, Bulgaria, Greece, Iraq,
Istanbul, Izmir, Persia, Serbia, Stalingrad, Suez.
Nationalist_Spain(5): Burgos, Madrid, Morocco,
Portugal, Valencia.
DEADLINE SCHEDULE:
(all orders are due NLT 6PM CET (GMT+1)...not
local time)
o Summer 1943
Retreats: 10 September
o Fall 1943 Moves: 15 September
ORDERS MAP:
RESULTS MAP:[Reply] |
| DC319: Winter 1942 Retreats/Adjustments - charlesf (Sep 05, 2010, 4:11 pm) |
Hi guys,
first of all, let me note that Kyle's late orders had the grace
period provision kick in. Right now, it appears that armies are
à la mode, whereas Britain's squadrons outside home waters were
scrapped. Tough times for England - at least off the pitch.
Though on the pitch Capello's boys have scored an impressive 4-0
against Bulgaria (hm, Bulgaria brings up traumatic '94 memories
for us Germans). Are the Three Lions gonna repeat their record
with an impressive qualifying campaign only to then fizzle out
in the following tournament? I wonder.
But I digress... We have a game-end proposal on the table,
namely a four-way German-Italian-Polish-Turkish draw. So please
include your votes with your orders for the upcoming season that
is to be adjucated this coming Wednesday, 8 September.
Good luck in 1943!
Charles
----------
PLAYERS:
BRITAIN: DavidCheGould
<davidchegould(at)bigpond.com>
FRANCE: Joao Queiros
<jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com>
GERMANY: Ghostine, Jimmy
<Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org>
ITALY & NAT. SPAIN: Dirk Knemeyer dirk(at)knemeyer.com
POLAND: Kyle Overby-Lee
<tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com>
SOVIET UNION & REP. SPAIN: Nigel Phillips
<nephilli99(at)hotmail.com> (eliminated Winter
193
TURKEY: Repu Maoni <wesaq(at)list.ru>
HEADLINES:
o ARMY-FLEET RATIO SHIFTS IN FAVOUR OF
LANDLUBBERS
PRESS: None.
ADJUSTMENTS:
Britain:
Remove F Arctic Ocean
Remove F Egypt(nc)
Germany:
Build A Munich
Italy:
Build waived
Poland:
Build A Warsaw
SUPPLY CENTER OWNERSHIP
(Winter 1942):
Britain(3): Brest, Egypt, Liverpool.
France(2): London, Paris.
Germany(11): Austria, Belgium, Berlin, Croatia,
Czechia, Denmark, Hamburg, Hungary, Munich,
Netherlands, Sweden.
Italy(7): Algiers, Marseille, Milan, Naples,
Rome, Switzerland, Tripoli.
Poland(11): Cracow, Edinburgh, Finland, Gdynia,
Latvia, Leningrad, Lithuania, Moscow, Norway,
Rumania, Warsaw.
Turkey(11): Ankara, Beirut, Bulgaria, Greece,
Iraq, Istanbul, Izmir, Persia, Serbia, Stalingrad,
Suez.
Nationalist_Spain(5): Burgos, Madrid, Morocco,
Portugal, Valencia.
DEADLINE SCHEDULE: (all
orders are due NLT 6PM CET (GMT+1)...not local
time)
o Spring 1943 Moves: 8 September
MAP:[Reply] |
| DC319: Fall 1942 Moves - charlesf (Sep 03, 2010, 7:14 am) |
Hi guys,
well, I had no idea archiving
emails would take half a lifetime... Well, I didn't manage to
lose any emails along the way to their new home.
Now, the fall season has been remarkably quiescent in many
theatres of operations, much of the more decisive manoeuvres
being centred in the North-West quadrant at the expense of
Britain, which has lost half of its supply centres this year.
I'm scheduling the Winter season
for Sunday, 5 September and the Spring moves for Wednesday, 8
September. I hope that works for you. If not, let me know.
Liebe Grüsse,
Charles
----------
PLAYERS:
BRITAIN: DavidCheGould
<davidchegould(at)bigpond.com>
FRANCE: Joao Queiros
<jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com>
GERMANY: Ghostine, Jimmy
<Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org>
ITALY & NAT. SPAIN: Dirk Knemeyer dirk(at)knemeyer.com
POLAND: Kyle Overby-Lee
<tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com>
SOVIET UNION & REP. SPAIN: Nigel Phillips
<nephilli99(at)hotmail.com> (eliminated Winter
193
TURKEY: Repu Maoni <wesaq(at)list.ru>
HEADLINES:
o PRIME MINISTER LEFT STANDING IN GAME OF
MUSICAL CHAIRS
PRESS: None.
ORDERS:
Britain:
F Brest Supports F Picardy - English Channel
(*Cut*)
F Edinburgh - Yorkshire
F Egypt(nc) Hold
F Picardy - English Channel
F Arctic Ocean - Norwegian Sea (*Fails*)
France:
F London Supports F North Sea - English Channel
(*Void*)
A Paris - Brest (*Bounce*)
Germany:
A Austria Supports A Hungary
A Belgium - Picardy
A Croatia Hold
A Czechia Supports A Austria
F Denmark Supports F Helgoland Bight - North Sea
A Hungary Supports A Croatia
A Lorraine Supports A Belgium - Picardy
A Munich - Hamburg
F Netherlands - Belgium
F Helgoland Bight - North Sea
Italy:
A Marseille - Gascony
A Slovenia - Rome (*Bounce*)
A Switzerland - Burgundy
A Trentino - Switzerland
F Adriatic Sea - Rome(ec) (*Bounce*)
F Libyan Sea - Tripoli
Poland:
F Archangel - Leningrad(nc)
A Cracow Supports A Rumania
A Leningrad - Finland
A Moscow Supports F Archangel - Leningrad(nc)
A Norway Supports A Leningrad - Finland
A Rumania Supports A Transylvania
A Siberia - Archangel
A Slovakia Supports A Austria
A Transylvania Supports A Serbia
F North Sea - Edinburgh
Turkey:
A Bulgaria Supports A Serbia
F Dodecanese Supports F Aegean Sea
A Greece Supports A Serbia
A Iraq Hold
A Kurdistan Hold
A Serbia Supports A Croatia
F Stalingrad(wc) Hold
A Suez - Egypt (*Fails*)
F Aegean Sea Supports A Greece
F Arabian Sea Hold
F Eastern Mediterranean Hold
Nationalist_Spain:
A Rome - Piedmont
F Atlantic Ocean Hold
F Ionian Sea Supports F Libyan Sea - Tripoli
F Norwegian Sea Supports F North Sea - Edinburgh
(*Cut*)
F South-Western Approaches - Brest (*Bounce*)
PENDING RETREATS: None.
PENDING ADJUSTMENTS:
Britain:
Remove
Remove
Germany:
Build
Italy:
Build
Poland:
Build
SUPPLY CENTER OWNERSHIP (Winter 1941):
Britain: Belgium, Brest, Edinburgh,
Egypt, Liverpool, Tripoli.
France: London, Paris.
Germany: Austria, Berlin, Croatia,
Czechia, Denmark, Hamburg, Hungary,
Munich, Netherlands, Sweden.
Italy: Algiers, Marseille, Milan,
Naples, Rome, Switzerland.
Poland: Cracow, Finland, Gdynia,
Latvia, Leningrad, Lithuania, Moscow,
Norway, Rumania, Warsaw.
Turkey: Ankara, Beirut, Bulgaria,
Greece, Iraq, Istanbul, Izmir, Persia,
Serbia, Stalingrad, Suez.
Nationalist Spain: Burgos, Madrid,
Morocco, Portugal, Valencia.
DEADLINE
SCHEDULE: (all orders are due NLT 6PM
CET (GMT+1)...not local time)
o Winter 1942
Retreats/Adjustments: 5 September
o Spring 1943 Moves: 8 September
ORDERS MAP:
RESULTS MAP:[Reply] |
| DC319: Coming Adjucation - charlesf (Sep 02, 2010, 9:43 am) |
Hi guys,
I've just got my new personal laptop delivered and
will do the adjucation once I've transferred my data from my old rickety
machine. Just thought I'd give you a heads-up.
Charles[Reply] |
| DC319: Fall deadline on 1 September - charlesf (Aug 25, 2010, 2:22 pm) |
Hi guys,
as I was asked to do so by a player, I'm now
setting the Fall deadline for Wednesday, 1 September. Please take note of
this.
Charles[Reply] |
| DC319: Summer 1942 Retreat - charlesf (Aug 25, 2010, 6:17 am) |
Hi guys,
ok, here's the official summer retreat
adjucation.
I'm rescheduling the Fall 1942 Moves for
Friday, 27 August. Should anyone prefer me to set the deadline for Wednesday, 1
September, I shall do so.
Sorry for having kept you waiting.
Liebe
Grüsse,
Charles
----------
PLAYERS:
BRITAIN: DavidCheGould
<davidchegould(at)bigpond.com>
FRANCE: Joao Queiros
<jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com>
GERMANY: Ghostine, Jimmy
<Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org>
ITALY & NAT. SPAIN: Dirk Knemeyer
dirk(at)knemeyer.com
POLAND: Kyle Overby-Lee
<tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com>
SOVIET UNION & REP. SPAIN: Nigel
Phillips <nephilli99(at)hotmail.com> (eliminated
Winter 193
TURKEY: Repu Maoni
<wesaq(at)list.ru>
HEADLINES:
o ARCHANGEL BECOMES NEW POLISH NAVAL
BASE
PRESS: None.
RETREATS:
Poland:
F Arctic Ocean - Archangel
SUPPLY CENTER OWNERSHIP
(Winter 1941):
Britain: Belgium, Brest,
Edinburgh, Egypt, Liverpool, Tripoli.
France: London,
Paris.
Germany: Austria, Berlin, Croatia, Czechia,
Denmark, Hamburg, Hungary, Munich, Netherlands, Sweden.
Italy: Algiers, Marseille, Milan, Naples, Rome,
Switzerland.
Poland: Cracow, Finland, Gdynia, Latvia,
Leningrad, Lithuania, Moscow, Norway, Rumania, Warsaw.
Turkey: Ankara, Beirut, Bulgaria, Greece, Iraq, Istanbul, Izmir, Persia,
Serbia, Stalingrad, Suez.
Nationalist Spain: Burgos,
Madrid, Morocco, Portugal, Valencia.
DEADLINE SCHEDULE: (all orders are due NLT 6PM
CET (GMT+1)...not local time)
o Fall 1942
Moves: 27 August
MAP:[Reply] |
| DC319: Adjudication? - jlqueiros (Aug 24, 2010, 5:08 am) |
Dear Charles,
Hope everything is ok. This delay in the adjudication is a bit strange, namely taking into account all your earlier enthusiam in GMing and testing this excellent variant you've created. Even if you don't have a lot of time, could you drop a few lines just informing us when you foresee to be able to adjudicate the S1942 retreats?
Many thanks,
João[Reply] |
| DC319: Spring 1942 Moves - charlesf (Aug 12, 2010, 3:13 pm) |
Hi guys,
sorry for having kept you waiting. It's been a crazy past few days. So,
what's happened this season?
I'm having a slight déjà-vu in that it appears something of an East-West
confrontation is shaping up, something which had long been the prevalent
alliance structure in the other game I'm GMing (a 1648 game), which led to
something like WW1 trench-warfare for a good number of years before a critical
stab utterly changed the European situation. Though of course our game's a far
cry from that extreme situation. Really, I should some day delve into the mail
you kindly CC me and get down to all the nefarious stuff that I trust is
happening. Though unfortunately my schedule will have to relax before I can
indulge in some of that intriguing correspondence-snooping again. In the
meantime, I hope the game's still proving a fun challenge for you lot.
I've scheduled the Summer 1942 Retreats for Saturday, 13
August. The day the wall was built here in Berlin...
Liebe Grüsse,
Charles
----------
PLAYERS:
BRITAIN: DavidCheGould
<davidchegould(at)bigpond.com>
FRANCE: Joao Queiros
<jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com>
GERMANY: Ghostine, Jimmy
<Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org>
ITALY & NAT. SPAIN: Dirk Knemeyer
dirk(at)knemeyer.com
POLAND: Kyle Overby-Lee
<tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com>
SOVIET UNION & REP. SPAIN: Nigel
Phillips <nephilli99(at)hotmail.com> (eliminated
Winter 193
TURKEY: Repu Maoni
<wesaq(at)list.ru>
HEADLINES:
o PUNDITS WAFFLE ABOUT AN EAST-WEST
CONFLICT
PRESS:
None.
ORDERS:
Britain:
F Belgium Supports F Edinburgh - North Sea (*Disbanded*)
F
Brest - English Channel (*Bounce*)
F Edinburgh - North Sea (*Fails*)
F
Egypt(nc) Supports F Libyan Sea
F Picardy Supports F Belgium (*Cut*)
F
North-Western Approaches - Arctic Ocean
France:
F London - English Channel (*Bounce*)
A Paris - Burgundy
(*Bounce*)
Germany:
A Austria - Slovenia (*Fails*)
A Croatia Supports A Austria
- Slovenia (*Cut*)
A Czechia - Austria (*Fails*)
F Denmark Supports F
Skaggerak - North Sea
F Hamburg - Helgoland Bight
A Hungary Supports A
Czechia - Austria (*Fails*)
A Lorraine - Picardy (*Fails*)
A Munich
Supports A Czechia - Austria (*Fails*)
F Netherlands Supports A Rhineland -
Belgium
A Rhineland - Belgium
Italy:
A Marseille - Burgundy (*Bounce*)
A Rome - Slovenia
A
Switzerland Supports A Paris - Lorraine (*Void*)
A Trentino Supports A Rome -
Slovenia
F Adriatic Sea - Croatia (*Fails*)
F Libyan Sea Hold
Poland:
A Byelorussia - Leningrad
A Moscow Supports A Byelorussia -
Leningrad
A Norway Hold
A Rumania Supports A Transylvania
A Siberia
Hold
A Slovakia Supports A Czechia - Austria
A Transylvania Supports A
Rumania
A Volhynia - Cracow
F Arctic Ocean - Norwegian Sea
(*Dislodged*)
F Skaggerak - North Sea
Turkey:
A Bulgaria Supports A Serbia
F Dodecanese Supports F Eastern
Mediterranean - Libyan Sea
A Greece Supports A Serbia
A Iraq Hold
A
Kurdistan Hold
A Palestine - Suez
A Serbia Supports A Bulgaria
F
Stalingrad(wc) Hold
F Aegean Sea Supports F Eastern Mediterranean - Libyan
Sea
F Arabian Sea Supports A Palestine - Suez
F Eastern Mediterranean -
Libyan Sea (*Fails*)
Nationalist_Spain:
F Gibraltar - Atlantic Ocean
A Piedmont -
Rome
F Ionian Sea Supports F Libyan Sea
F Norwegian Sea Supports F
North-Western Approaches - Arctic Ocean
F South-Western Approaches Supports F
Gibraltar - Atlantic Ocean
PENDING RETREATS:
Polish F Arctic Ocean can retreat to Archangel or Iceland.
SUPPLY CENTER OWNERSHIP
(Winter 1941):
Britain: Belgium, Brest,
Edinburgh, Egypt, Liverpool, Tripoli.
France: London,
Paris.
Germany: Austria, Berlin, Croatia, Czechia,
Denmark, Hamburg, Hungary, Munich, Netherlands, Sweden.
Italy: Algiers, Marseille, Milan, Naples, Rome,
Switzerland.
Poland: Cracow, Finland, Gdynia, Latvia,
Leningrad, Lithuania, Moscow, Norway, Rumania, Warsaw.
Turkey: Ankara, Beirut, Bulgaria, Greece, Iraq, Istanbul, Izmir, Persia,
Serbia, Stalingrad, Suez.
Nationalist Spain: Burgos,
Madrid, Morocco, Portugal, Valencia.
DEADLINE SCHEDULE: (all orders are due NLT 6PM
CET (GMT+1)...not local time)
o Summer 1942 Retreats: 14 August
o Fall 1942
Moves: (16) 18 August
ORDERS MAP:
RESULTS MAP:[Reply] |
