Charles,
for what it's worth, I think the SU is underpowered (surprise, surprise) and Poland unhistorically strong. The changes to France may indirectly help, but a weak SU so far from Spain with a Italy in arguably a better position and closer to Spain directly, makes the civil war a distraction for the SU, and maybe even a disadvantage.
I'm not sure how much the last game is useful for typical lessons as to how things would play out again.
Nigs

Date: Sat, 18 Sep 2010 21:27:17 +0200
From: charlesf(at)web.de
To: dirk(at)knemeyer.com
CC: wesaq(at)list.ru; tomjnkns.IL(at)gmail.com; Jimmy.Ghostine(at)vtmednet.org; jlqueiros3(at)hotmail.com; dc319(at)diplomaticcorp.com; davidchegould(at)bigpond.com; c.p.mcinerney(at)gmail.com; dipping_chris(at)yahoo.com; ndeily(at)yahoo.com; congressofvienna1814(at)yahoo.com; VonPowell(at)aol.com; screwtape777(at)gmail.com; max.luckey(at)googlemail.com; mellinger(at)blitzbardgett.com; jamie_nordli(at)hotmail.com; nephilli99(at)hotmail.com; smileyrob68(at)gmail.com; sun.chung(at)gmail.com; nick.s.powell(at)gmail.com; wmysonski(at)gmail.com; karsten.nitsch(at)gmx.de; psychosis(at)sky.com; timothy.d.hayward(at)googlemail.com
Subject: Re: 1936 v1.4







Dirk and all,



thanks for your feedback. Always  good to have many "second
opinions" when operating on a patient.



The map I sent you is more of a draft for v1.4 than being
definitive. Particularly since my conviction on the merits of the
changes vary on each one.



A key question here is whether the changes strike a good balance
between a westerly and an easterly orientation of Italy. In other
words: whether the respective Franco-Italian and Turkish-Italian
friction levels are within a desirable range.



And there's another question that follows on from this: Is Italy
(and I'm factoring Nat.Spain, of course) sufficiently strong?



FRENCH ALGERIA




- I think this makes the Italian position weaker. Italy
simply can't have France building fleets in Alg given access to
the STS.



Having Algiers present a far more substantial danger to Italy indeed
does. But I don't agree that Italy cannot afford a French fleet
being built there. First of all, only Naples can be reached by such
a fleet within two moves (leaving aside Algiers-Tunis-Tripoli). So
in this regard, such a fleet build is no different from an army in
Marseilles marching on Milan.



It is more a later movement by such a fleet into NTS or ION that is
dangerous. Fortunately, a fleet build in Algiers gives the Duce a
clear warning. And unless Italy's totally committed in other
directions, a bounce in STS ought to be not so difficult to
engineer.



I'd suggest that Italy would do well to any of the following:

- ensure a French unit keeps blocking the Algiers build site

- have France agree not to build fleets there

- attack Algiers in an effort to make sure it's blocked by a French
unit or have it fall to Italy.



A Tripoli can do much to keep France honest - and more.



THE ALPINE FRONT




And with Tuscany, A Rom is channeled - almost forced - to
either go to the Balkans or Swi only.



I'd say A Rome's viable openings include moves to Croatia, Slovenia,
Austria and South Tyrol (thus pivotting towards Switzerland).
Remaining in place and supporting Austria is another good option
(kinda historically Italy's standing order until 193.



That's a pretty broad range of options. The unit just doesn't have
all that much of an anti-French use anymore (other than perhaps a
move to Naples in preparation for a convoy over to Algiers, though
I'd say that's probably not the best use of the unit early on.



One weighty reason why I've given A Rome a more easterly bent is
that in turn for greater friction over Algiers, I needed to reduce
Franco-Italian tensions in the Alps. Otherwise friction levels would
have gone through the roof.



So basically four sound opening move options remain for A Rome.
That's a healthy number. And two quite different directions:
striking out into the Balkans or up north into the alps
(Switzerland, Austria).




There is not an attack avenue on France.



Not for A Rome, no. But A Milan can gun for Marseilles immediately.
It's just that without Swiss help you cannot engineer a supported
move on Piedmont.



However, this somewhat diminished offensive potential in the Alps
also means that Piedmont's no longer an Italian soft-spot (i.e. a
locale adjacent to 2+ of her initial SCs).



I'd argue this somewhat decreased offensive potential is not much of
a loss for Italy (if you want to attack Marseilles, investing in
Switzerland may go a long way to defeating a French offensive in
Piedmont - and if France isn't doing that, you don't need a
supported attack anyway). But Italy gains CONSIDERABLY in terms of
security as Rome can't be taken by France in 1936.



Very much a net plus for Italy, methinks. And also for France,
because Italy won't be as paranoid about Piedmont with the redrawn
map.




So this map would seem to prevent Italy from channeling
force and instead to make a series of very defensive decisions:
to parry French or Turkish naval threats? Can't do both, and
whichever is ignored is in trouble.



Italy can mount exactly the same attack it was able to launch in
past versions. Just without A Rome and A Milan combining (hardly
much of a difference as A Switzerland is most likely to be decisive
in a clash over Piedmont).



TURKEY ETC.




Indeed, this makes France and Turkey - in my view - natural
allies. Good news for France, terrible for the USSR.



Oh, I've always considered those two well-suited to another. Their
relationship is characterised by second-degree proximity, which
tends to go hand-in-hand with good alliance potential. And no, A
Beirut, doesn't in my book transform that relationship into one of
first-degree proximity. If players nonetheless view Franco-Turkish
relations in that light, they're plainly misinterpreting what A
Beirut brings table.



Of course, much as France/Turkey enjoy good ally potential on
account of their second-degree proximity, so does the Italy/USSR
pairing (at least if players don't let Spanish affairs overly colour
their relationship).



Italy may also find in Britain now a more useful ally owing to its
more robust presence in the Near East. Perhaps also more of a rival,
but on the whole I'd rate this development as good news for Italy.




- Making Sue a build location is interesting, but I think is
a case where more strength on the board translates into
diplomatic weakness. If I'm Turkey I no longer want Sue out of
greed but out of self-preservation.



Aye, Anglo-Turkish relations are complicated by Britain's enhanced
role in Turkey's backyard. It's indeed something I was gunning for
and that also made me comfortable giving Britain this additional
capability.




That is a much sharper motive, and one that might railroad
more behaviour particularly in light of the fertile FT
possibilities and increased shared interest.



Conversely, that may in turn be met by an Anglo-Italian block.



All that being said, I do wonder if the redrawn Adriatic does overly
heighten IT friction. It's the one change I've been least certain
about. And indeed, I'm now thinking that I may well have turned
Greece into a space that pulls in Italy and Turkey into conflict
much in the way the old Ukraine space did with Poland and Turkey.



So, right now I'm leaning towards undoing the Adriatic change.



The one major motivation for it was that I wanted to further pull
Italy away from France. Perhaps that was overdoing it.




I suppose my biggest concern is that the USSR remains
underpowered, and the changes may further compromise their
position.



If anything, Turkey facing greater challenges HELPS Uncle Joe.




Surely if you can justify Turkey being a 3 SC power Russia
could be a 4.



Oh, an earlier version of 1936 had indeed 4 SCs. I cut it down to
three as you can see. Works better and also reprects the Soviet
weakness with all those purges going on.



SOVIET UNION




No special rules, create an SC for the Urals or something
and done. This seems the one gaping hole, despite your
bullishness over their 6 SC high water mark in 1937. In fact I
would challenge a truly top, expert player to take the current
position on a challenge and see what they could do with it. I
think it is terribly weak relative to the situation of the other
powers.



Piano, piano. As you know, I'm not in the least worried. In this
I'm as firm as I am about England's much-derided viability and
strength in 1648.




Another small change to consider with USSR is to not have Len
and NRG touch. It only compounds the potential or deep misery
for the Soviets, the nice jumping off point to blitz the British
in the mid-game notwithstanding.



Ah, I love that tension in the Far North! It's historical and makes
for more interesting gaming.


Despite my sharing the concern of others that France was
underpowered, as you know Charles France is one of the powers I
most want to play in this variant. Well, I have to say, even
these subtle changes make me think that now France could be a
premier power.



I'm in the camp of those who considered v1.3's France not too weak.
And now that I've given Algiers build site status, I take solace in
France's poor performance to date. My hope (and belief) is that I
haven't overpowered France.




Not sure the impact that would have on poor little Italy,
but it may help justify having Italy control the Nationalists,
providing an interesting counterweight in the far western Med.



The Nationalist presence of course very much has to be factored into
the Italian power calculation. And having that small base out West
comes also with the hefty potential of a united Spain.



Perhaps 1636's Italy is a power that either does very well or gets
squashed by neighbouring powers. With fairly little middle-ground.



In any case, I've enjoyed this exchange as well as the wider variant
discussion (as I trust you can tell by my long and numerous posts).
I'd love to hear more views on these changes. Just note that the
operating assumption here ought be that the Adriatic will be
returned to its original shape since that's where I am right now on
that question.



Cheers,



Charles







Dirk






On Sep 17, 2010, at 1:06 PM, Charles Féaux de la Croix
wrote:



Hi guys,



I've now decided to run with the various changes I
discussed in my past mail and implemented those on the
below v1.4 map. Here a summary of the changes:



- Both Algiers and Suez are no longer marked
with a red circle as they're now regular HSCs.



- The Tyrrhenian Sea has been divided into Northern and
Southern Tyrrhenian Sea spaces.



- Tuscany makes a comeback.



- The Adriatic now adjoins Greece.



- I've removed the Abruzzi buffer province that was
geared to facilitate an amphibious landing in Italy.
Given the redrawn Adriatic adds to Italy's defense
worries in the East, I felt I might help out Italy be
removing that landing-site.



- I also cut out the now fairly redundant-seeming
Ligurian Sea space. As the SC-space ratio is already
pretty high at 1:2.56, I felt it wise to not further
increase the number of overall spaces. Standard has a
ratio of 1:2.2. Plainly 1936 is a whole lot more fluid
variant, though some of 1936's spaces (e.g. Iceland,
Kuweit, Caspian) are only of very marginal use. So the
"effective" ratio is arguably somewhat lower.


All-in-all, I'd say that Franco-Italian tension is
increased in Africa (owing to the threat potential of the
Algiers HSC), while round Piedmont it has been reduced by
a fair amount. To the East, Turkish-Italian rivalry over
Greece has been intensified.



I'd be interested to hear your take on these recalibration
measures in the wake of Algiers and Suez being promoted to
HSC status.



Charles



<1936_14.jpg>